If anything’s clear 20 months on from Hamas’s attack on Israel, it’s that Iran and its proxies were never up to a gloves-off, head-to-head confrontation with a fully-modernized military backed by a world class intelligence service.
No one claimed that for Hamas individually, but due in large part to Hezbollah’s gritty performance during the 2006 war in Lebanon and Iran’s status as a “missile power,” a myth grew around the notion that in fact, Tehran and its network were capable of sustaining, and maybe even winning, a real war against Israel.
Khamenei and Hassan Nasrallah gleefully perpetuated that myth despite probably not believing it themselves. Their rhetorical flourishes and similarly overwrought harangues from the IRGC command became so routine over the years as to be largely ignorable — akin, almost, to Kim Jong-Un’s apocalyptic finger-wagging to Washington and Seoul.
Israeli hardliners reveled in the myth of Iranian prowess too. The more existential the threat, the easier it is to maintain consistent support for hawkish policy positions which might otherwise fall out of favor with younger, more secular-minded voters.
The overarching problem with the idea of Iran — or anyone else for that matter — as an existential threat to the Israeli state is the IDF nuclear deterrent. Israel possess dozens, and maybe even hundreds, of nuclear weapons. Further, the IDF’s supplied by the US military industrial complex and Israel enjoys unfettered access to hard currency. Neither Iran nor any of its proxies can say any of that.
Tehran did have one thing going for it militarily, though: An unparalleled capacity for low-level, regional power projection through highly capable militias in Iraq (which became a pseudo-client state of Iran post-Saddam), a staunch ally in Bashar al-Assad’s Damascus (Syria became an out-and-out Iranian dependent following the onset of civil war in 2011) and Hezbollah, a non-state actor more capable on most vectors than the official Lebanese government of which it was anyway a part.
That network boasted a star-studded lineup of hall-of-famer strategists (e.g., Fuad Shukr and Ibrahim Aqil), indispensable facilitators (e.g., Razi Mousavi) and go-betweens (e.g., Saleh al-Arouri) and on-the-field commanders ranging from “new generation” leaders like Abu Bakr Al-Saadi to full-on legends like Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
Through that matrix, the Quds Force under Qassem Soleimani exercised enormous influence over three ostensibly sovereign nations: Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
Khamenei’s not a figurehead in the traditional sense of the term. He has the ultimate say-so in all matters to do with the Iranian state, both as it relates to domestic and foreign policy. But it often felt, prior to Soleimani’s death, like Khamenei’s quasi-mystic, grandiose narratives about the inevitable expulsion of the Jewish state — his hysterically belligerent fulminations against “Little Satan” and its superpower benefactors in Washington — obscured the very real, but in no way existential, threat posed by Soleimani’s network.
While Khamenei and Nasrallah barked about an inevitable judgment day for “the evil Zionists,” and while Israel and the US trafficked in armageddon narratives about Iran’s MacGyvered nuclear weapons program, Soleimani established himself as the most powerful warlord on the planet, bar none, with dominion over a land corridor that stretched from Tehran to Beirut.
In a testament to Soleimani’s regional sway, the US had to partner with his militias in Iraq to drive ISIS from the country, an overtly Faustian bargain which entailed arm’s length collaboration between the Pentagon and a man whose IEDs killed and maimed thousands of American soldiers. In Syria, Vladimir Putin relied on Soleimani to coordinate the ground operations which, under cover of Russian air power, succeeded in restoring the Assad regime to power in 2016.
If you conducted a secret poll of Iraqi politicians before 2020 and asked them to name the most powerful man in the country, they would’ve told you that man doesn’t live in Iraq, but rather in Iran and his title isn’t “Supreme Leader.” If you asked Mossad in 2019 to name public enemy number one, they wouldn’t have told you Khamenei. You get the idea.
As I’ve emphasized repeatedly since Soleimani’s assassination, Iran’s capacity to project power and, just as importantly, the vision for how that power should be projected, when and where, resided almost entirely with one guy. With the possible exception of the 1990s Chicago Bulls, it was the most extreme example of “key man risk” ever witnessed, in any context.
Given that, why’d it take so long for somebody to kill him? One argument (the one I buy) says that although everyone recognized Soleimani as the linchpin, no one, perhaps not even Soleimani himself, appreciated the extent to which inter-network cohesion and, more importantly, initiative, depended on his remaining among the living.
While ostensibly united behind a shared purpose (or at least a set of common goals), the groups which comprised the network weren’t exactly homogeneous, even if you exclude Hamas to control for the sectarian divide. If you were a mid-level guy in one of the Iraqi militias, you didn’t wake up every day fretting over Southern Lebanon, and if you were a new Hezbollah recruit, you weren’t losing sleep over the US Marine presence in Iraq.
Sure, everyone listened to the rah-rah speeches and everybody had one of those small portraits of Khamenei hanging up in their living rooms, but any one individual’s connection to the broader cause ran through the Quds, which is to say through Qassem, and the marching orders ultimately came from him, not from Khamenei.
(As a quick aside: Hezbollah wasn’t as subordinate to Soleimani as that makes it sound. Nasrallah didn’t “take orders” from Soleimani any more than the Quds “took orders” from Nasrallah, but whatever nuance there is to be had there isn’t important for the broader discussion.)
To be clear, Soleimani didn’t pursue any sort of rogue agenda at odds with Khamenei’s grand vision. The point is that Khamenei gave him almost complete operational latitude to determine how Iran should go about conducting the “resistance” on a day-to-day basis. More or less without exception, Soleimani’s vision entailed the painstaking cultivation of disciplined proxies with remits tailored in such a way as to further both their own localized goals and the broader Iranian agenda. Over time, that process resulted in a sprawling web which could be mobilized for concerted action when prudent and necessary (e.g., to retake Aleppo for the Assad regime in 2015 and 2016).
Soleimani didn’t survive for as long as he did because no one knew where he was. Everyone knew where he was. His habit for taking selfies (literal selfies) on the front lines of regional conflicts became a meme in intelligence circles. He survived in no small part because the US and Israel assumed that to kill him was to invite a war not just with Iran, but with everyone loyal to him from Beirut to Baghdad and back again.
The only person willing to risk that was Donald Trump, and his gamble accidentally paid off: As it turns out, the network’s key man risk was so extreme it’d become self-referential. In a situation like that which occurred at Baghdad International Airport on January 3, 2020 (when Soleimani was assassinated with Mahdi al-Muhandis), the network would confer with Soleimani to decide how to respond. See the problem there?
In the years since that fateful day, the network arguably lost the plot. The point was never to cultivate an alliance of militia for an eventual assault on Israel. That’s absurd. The vision was to establish for Iran an umbrella of influence spanning Iraq, Syria and Lebanon that would serve as a counterweight to the Sunni powers and as a deterrent — in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon, it was almost an insurance policy — to any designs Israel and the US might have on regime change.
Without Soleimani, network cohesion suffered badly. Esmail Qaani — who died for at least the third time in six months on Friday — proved ineffectual on competent days and inept on all the others. It’s hard to blame him. The shoes into which he stepped shouldn’t have been as big as they were. No one could’ve succeeded in that role.
It’s not so much that the whole thing fell apart under Qaani as much as it is that the network lacked a unifying raison d’être. “Death to Israel” is something the Sayyeds carry on about at prayer gatherings and pep rallies, it’s not something you “do.” Not unless you’re Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, which is where this entire story dead ends. If the beginning of the end was January 3, 2020, the end of the end (if you will) was October 7, 2023.
Sinwar took “Death to Israel” literally. To him, it was deeply personal. There are conflicting accounts as to what he thought would happen post-October 7, but the inescapable bottom line is that Sinwar overestimated Iran’s commitment to the cause. He thought (or seems to have believed) that Iran, Hezbollah and maybe even the militias in Iraq, were as ready as he was to fight the final battle. But they weren’t. And, again, it’s fair to ask if that was ever going to be on the cards. I don’t think it was. Not from the Iranian side, anyway.
What seems obvious now is that at some point in late 2023, Israel realized that Sinwar’s delusions of grandeur might’ve opened the door for the IDF and Mossad to force a war on Nasrallah and Khamenei that neither man wanted nor believed they could win. What started with the assassination of Razi Mousavi on a farm that doubled as a Hezbollah operations center just outside Damascus on December 25, 2023, had within 10 months morphed into a no-holds-barred assault on Hezbollah in the Beirut suburbs.
Hezbollah’s counterintelligence deficiencies were already apparent after pinpoint strikes killed the above-mentioned Fuad Shukr and Ibrahim Aqil, but when Mossad blew up hundreds of pagers on the hips of Hezbollah members on September 17, Nasrallah was suddenly awake to the terrifying possibility that neither his location nor that of his cousin and heir were a secret to Israel. 10 days later, the IDF put him back to sleep. Permanently.
In “Turning Point,” I called Nasrallah’s death “a pivotal moment for Iran.” The regime, I wrote, on September 28, is “staring into the abyss.” “If Nasrallah’s fair game, Khamenei is too,” I said.
Fast forward eight months and Israel’s in the process of exposing the regime just as the IDF and Mossad exposed Hezbollah. Reports out of Tehran indicate that Khamenei and the IRGC were well aware that Israel was poised to strike, but believed that because the Trump administration was still committed to Sunday nuclear talks in Oman, the IDF would wait at least until the conclusion of those talks before launching an attack.
It’s astounding that the regime could’ve been that naive — that no one in the room had the presence of mind to say, “Hey, you know, it’s probably occurred to Israel that we’re thinking along these lines, and if it has, they might very well hit us before Sunday knowing we won’t expect it.” But no one did. No one said that, or even thought it, by appearances.
“The night of Israel’s attack, senior military commanders did not shelter in safe houses and instead stayed in their own homes, a fateful decision,” The New York Times reported, adding that Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the Guards’ aerospace unit, “ignored a directive against congregating in one location,” choosing instead to hold “an emergency war meeting at a military base” with his entire staff. The IDF killed them — all of them — where they sat.
That suggests Israel didn’t have to look very hard to find the generals they killed Friday, but even if they’d gone to their safe houses, it should be painfully obvious to Iran by now that Mossad knows where everyone is and always has. How many times have I said that over the past year? Dozens. And how many top Iranian assets have been killed over that same time period? Again, dozens.
It’s almost as if it hasn’t occurred yet to the regime that Israel likely has the location of everyone of any rank including Khamenei, just like they knew where Nasrallah was, and just like they were tracking Hashem Safieddine, and just like they knew where Hamas’s late political chief Ismail Haniyeh slept when he visited Tehran.
We’re witnessing the end of the regime, and quite possibly the end of Khamenei himself. I’m quite sure of that. Or as sure as it’s possible to be about such things. Israel was still at it Saturday, and now they’re after the oil too. Fars said the IDF was firing on Iran’s refineries and energy infrastructure including the South Pars gas field.
In a video message, Benjamin Netanyahu said the IDF has “paved a path to Tehran.” Soon, he said, Israeli warplanes will be flying over the Iranian capital. “We will strike every site and every target of the ayatollahs’ regime,” he declared. “What they have felt until now is nothing compared to what they will feel in the coming days.”
Perhaps the most complete analysis I’ve read on this. It’s amazing you worked in finance and not at Langley. Impressive summary.
Agree !
Agree with all of this. What the US commits to in terms of actual military support now is also an important consideration, particularly in terms of neutralizing Fordow.
Houthi Chief of Staff allegedly taken out in Yemen by the Israelis as well.
Is there any chance Russia moves to defend or assist Iran?
Hell no. They couldn’t even marshal enough resources to help Assad defend Damascus from the remnants of the Nusra Front in December. And they’re going to rush into Tehran, in the middle of full-on IDF air campaign or try to patrol those skies? Not a chance.
Plus, Putin’s relationship with Netanyahu isn’t “bad,” per se. It’s not great either and the Kremlin’s undoubtedly displeased by what’s going on, but I’m sure that at some point over the last 48 hours Putin communicated to Khamenei that he’s on his own. There’s nothing Russia can do for him.
Thank you for the response.
ISW has pointed out that Russia hasn’t even been able to replace any of Iran’s air defense assets that were destroyed in October.
Russia has no slack.
So when is the Grand Ayatollah gonna get in his plane and fly to Switzerland where plenty of his money probably is? I can’t imagine he would feel safe in most places in Iran. And now even the airspace is pretty much controlled by IDF so he may not be safe to fly out unless he has a Russian air escort. He will probably surface somewhere outside Iran pretty soon is my guess. Excellent chronicle of the events Mr. H.
Iran is a pretty big place. Without mid-air refueling services from the Americans, Israel can’t reach ~half of the country.
You sure about that? They just blew up a Boeing parked at Mashhad Airport. That’s waayyy over there next to Turkmenistan.
After these last 20 months, I’m no longer confident in any official assessments of what Israel can/can’t do, does/doesn’t have. I mean, everyone understood that taking the gloves off with them is a very, very risky gamble, but I don’t think anyone anticipated just how capable and efficient they’ve proven to be, and also how willing they really are to go it alone if necessary.
Is there any chance that our assessments of Iran’s ability to create mayhem is also being downplayed too much?
For one: after 9/11 populist media (NY Post & such) loved to remind us of the threat posed by “dirty bombs” which do not require a a missile to deliver. We haven’t been treated to that chatter for a while – has that threat been negated?
Or even in the Straits of Hormuz where past history suggests can be disrupted by underwater mines. Just disrupted, not blocked. But both would require a similarly massive naval response, further stretching our already depleted global military resources.
Hot damn.
According to Google, that’s 461 miles East of Tehran.
Times of Israel: “The IDF confirms the Israeli Air Force bombed an Iranian refueling plane at Mashhad Airport in northeast Iran, some 2,300 kilometers from Israel, marking the most distant strike since the beginning of the operation… The strike on Mashhad Airport potentially marks the Israeli Air Force’s farthest-ever strike. In 1985, the IAF struck the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunisia, also over 2,000 kilometers from Israel.”
From The Aviationist: “Though it cannot be completely confirmed, the image used alongside the official Israeli report depicts an F-16I ‘Sufa’, suggesting this aircraft type might have been the one used for the raid. The F-16I is fitted with conformal fuel tanks, but in this image the aircraft is also seen equipped with external drop tanks. Aerial refueling would likely still be necessary at some stage, but this loadout would offer exceptional range performance that could facilitate such a deep strike.”
It seems that, much like wagers with Bricktop’s bookies, all bets are off.
Unlike Soleimani, Khmanei’s shoes aren’t that big. And, since he’s 86, there’s surely another ayatollah waiting in the wings (if not, Khamenei’s been grossly derelict).
Have you seen the images from Tehran today? The exploding gas depots and all that? It doesn’t look, to this observer anyway, like Israel intends to let this regime carry on at all.
It’s even worse now. But Israel would be downright stupid to leave Iran in anarchy. Many of those Iranians will be motivated Israel haters, and if we try to clean up the mess, US haters.
H; facts relay news
Understanding human drama and ambitions along with the facts makes a great story.
This was great story telling,
Thank you
Sadly our dear ally Ahmed Chalabi is no longer able to help the GOP guide us through this complex crisis. It’s very sad.
I’ll pile on wih another “nicely done” on your analysis.
Very insightful. Thank you for your analysis.
End the regime. Let Isreal bring peace to that place for 10 years.
I doubt there’s any support for the Islamic Republic among many, if any, readers here, but “ending regimes” doesn’t usually bring peace, just chaos and unforeseen consequences (remember ISIS). And I don’t see Israel or the Trump Administration, or frankly any American administration, putting in the resources to help rebuild the Iranian state.
Iran is a bit different from some other cases we’ve seen during the 00s and 10s. The majority of Iranians don’t want this regime and definitely not another crazy theocracy to follow it. They would have revolted already if it wasn’t through extremely repressive violence – e.g. security forces shooting little girls in the streets and in the prisons raping them has been commonplace. Iranians will do just fine without US assistance once the regime is gone.
H-Man, could be the end for the K man but then what? The country oil troopers (you know the suspects) all toe the line, maybe Iran joins the oil troopers. That leaves Lebanon, Syria and Iraq leading the charge. Not much there, head to Yemen for the Houthi revival, not much there since the deal was cut: don’t bomb ships, we don’t bomb you. Gaza, well Iran take a look at Gaza and ask if that is worth repeating?
Is that the answer?
Reading your analysis alongside the Sunday newspapers, I now feel like the newspapers are like a mushed up gerber baby food, made to be palatable to a child, whereas yours is adult food.
( I’m dieting so food is on my brain)
Great work H , appreciate your insights as always
Great analogy. I have been trying to expand my reading of various news sources to flesh out my understanding of the issues and avoid single-source bias, but there is really no comparison to Heisenberg.
Very impressive analysis and summary of the state of affairs in Iran and its proxies.
Who is likely to lead Iran if, in fact, there is a regime change from Khamenei?
Is it possible that Reza Pahlavi (the son of the Shah) would rise to the top? His family was exiled in 1979.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reza_Pahlavi,_Crown_Prince_of_Iran
I’m no expert, but I can’t imagine any demand for the Pahlavis from the street. They were brutal bloodsuckers and there’s no reason to expect otherwise from BabyShah. Expect a period of chaos followed by a secular strong man.
On the other hand, look who’s in Malacañang Palace.
That would be the rough equivalent of the Russians bringing back the actual czars after the fall of the USSR. Everyday Russians may not have liked their Communist system, but nobody was looking to former czarist Russia for leadership of the country.
I get it was over 45 years ago and the Islamic Republic has been on the Axis of Evil spectrum since 1979, but I’m not sure people recall how deeply, deeply unpopular the last shah of Iran was.
A truly excellent analysis, though you mention conflicting accounts of what Yahya Sinwar was expecting after the October 7 attacks. I’ve always felt that Hamas launched the attacks because they feared the possibility of detente between Israel and at least some of the Arab world. Were that to happen, Hamas’s relevance (and its power base) would be greatly diminished. This is the reason the attacks were especially brutal — they were inviting an equally brutal response from Israel. So brutal that no Arab nation would have considered any sort of detente with the Jewish state afterwards.
Sinwar’s miscalculation was apparently expecting that, once the body count rose high enough, the US would step in and try to broker some sort of cease-fire that would allow Hamas, though battered, to stay in place. He also, as you pointed out, miscalculated the commitment of Iran and Hezbollah to Hamas’s insanely cynical gambit. All this at the cost, of course, of thousands of Palestinian lives.
And, it would seem, at the cost of Nasrallah’s life and potentially Khamenei’s, as you also point out. Iran’s and Hezbollah’s lack of support for Hamas made the weakness of their position painfully obvious and Netanyahu was happy to take full advantage.
Though how this will all end, is anyone’s guess right now.
What are the chances at this point that Syria, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iran will recognize Israel? Are the current hostilities making this a less or more possible outcome? For Iran, it would obviously take a regime change, but what about the remaining Arab nations?