Iran Has No Plausible Deniability For US Troop Deaths

Iran doesn't give orders to the groups which comprise its "Axis of Resistance." And the regime in Tehran doesn't intercede or otherwise try to influence how those groups go about expressing their solidarity with Hamas in Gaza. That's all according to Nasser Kanaani, a spokesman for Iran's foreign ministry, which attempted on Monday to establish something like plausible deniability in the wake of a deadly attack on Tower 22, a US logistics hub in northeast Jordan. The outpost, which houses hund

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10 thoughts on “Iran Has No Plausible Deniability For US Troop Deaths

    1. Agreed. At this point in time, we absolutely need Iran to control the various groups of thugs over there. Imagine the chaos without Iran in place!

      The only viable long term solution is to start drilling for oil in the US, promote nuclear and pull our military out of anywhere in the ME, where we are not wanted.

      If we want to continue to purchase oil from the ME until we have adequate nuclear in place; no problem- we can somewhat control the price by increasing domestic drilling ( sorry- but until we have nuclear- humans are going to be polluting the planet with carbon based fuels).

      Worried about shipping lanes through the Red Sea? Some combination of money, shipping on a non-US registered ship or going around Africa are all viable options.

      The similarities of Israel to South Africa back in the 1980’s/90’s, as apartheid was ending, are very similar. At some point, it is going to be impossible to enforce “rule of law” with respect to Israel’s GDP per capita of $54,660 compared to Palestine ($3,440), Iran ($4,200), Iraq ($5,900) or Jordan ($4,900), just to name a few. Especially given the population of Israel, which is 9.2M vs. 205M in just Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Syria, combined.

      It is all about the money. Furthermore, sourcing oil from the ME instead of domestically in the US is not worth WW3.

    1. To your question about the “strangeness” (from your comment on the original article published right after the attack) it’s possible (and I mentioned this in January and February of 2020 before the pandemic took over every headline) that without Soleimani, some of these proxies might start to wing it. He’d show up, randomly, in Iraq, to check on stuff at times and in places where he wasn’t scheduled to show up. If you were a deputy (i.e., a field commander) in one of these militias, you might walk out of a tent one morning and there he’d be, shaking hands and doing that creepy side-eye thing where he’d raise one eyebrow halfway up his forehead, while the other one sat completely still. This is pure speculation on my part, but as far as pure speculation goes, I’m pretty confident that none of these militias are in awe of Esmail Qaani. That doesn’t mean they don’t want his money and support and so on, but I doubt seriously that these guys are terrified of Qaani showing up out of the blue on the front lines. I don’t think he does that, and I’m quite sure the militia don’t have to worry about Qaani personally executing commanders in the middle of the desert, which is something Soleimani certainly would’ve done if he thought somebody was jeopardizing Iran’s interests without permission.

      1. Biden is trying hard to avoid escalating vs Iran and its proxies. Reportedly, he resisted the US military’s recommendations for larger strikes against the Houthis, until forced to accede by Houthis’ increasing attacks on shipping and Navy vessels. I imagine there have been urgent back-channel appeals to Iran by the US and others, including China.

        If Iran’s proxies continue increasing attacks on shipping and US bases, then either i) assumptions about Iran’s motivation to avoid military involvement are wrong, ii) assumptions about the extent of Iran’s control over its proxies are wrong, iii) Iran is significantly miscalculating the US’ reaction, or iv) the US is willing to accept more hits on shipping and more casualties among US troops and potentially US Navy ships.

        I don’t think iv) is likely, partly because its an election year and partly because I think Biden takes US casualties seriously. I don’t know enough about Iran to guess between i), ii), and iii). I think it is “strange” – a feeling I’m having more and more – to see defense names and Brent down on the weekend’s events. Maybe investors simply aren’t focused on geopolitical this week, given the packed economic/earnings calendar?

  1. I’ve wondered if Israel would take the shot when it comes to Nasrallah–assuming they were provided the opportunity. You couldn’t kick the hornets’ nest much harder than that, and Israel might well be loath to invite that level of heat.

    1. I have always felt it was just a publicity play from DC to increase their leverage with the electorate. After all, we originally armed Hussein to face Iran as our proxy. After 9/11 we needed some way to placate the electorate with 2004 on the way. So we turned on our guy by naming him as a terrorist, when we knew all along it was the Saudis (our ally and second largest customer/supplier) who actually funded the 9/11attack and got a free pass.

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