Iran doesn’t give orders to the groups which comprise its “Axis of Resistance.” And the regime in Tehran doesn’t intercede or otherwise try to influence how those groups go about expressing their solidarity with Hamas in Gaza.
That’s all according to Nasser Kanaani, a spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry, which attempted on Monday to establish something like plausible deniability in the wake of a deadly attack on Tower 22, a US logistics hub in northeast Jordan.
The outpost, which houses hundreds of American troops, is strategically significant. Following the deaths of three US service members there over the weekend, it’s symbolically significant too.
The simple map below tells you a lot. Tower 22 is near Al-Tanf, in Syria, which some (many) observers believe is baggage the US would be better served to shed.
Al-Tanf was initially used during the fight against ISIS. It’s a training camp for the repeatedly reheated leftovers of sundry Syrian opposition forces, which’ve been reconstituted and renamed so many times I doubt even they know who they are or what they’re called on any given day.
At various intervals, Bashar al-Assad, Russia and Iran have lambasted the US presence at Al-Tanf, deriding it as an illegal occupation (which it technically is). In 2018, Vladimir Putin’s de facto propaganda minister Maria Zakharova called the base “a blatant violation of Syria’s sovereignty [that’s] blocking the important transport link between Damascus and Baghdad.” Zakharova was referring to the base’s off-label mandate: It’s an ostensible counterbalance to Iranian influence in Syria.
I say “ostensible” because its effectiveness in that regard is questionable at best. There’s a so-called “deconfliction zone” around Al-Tanf, established during Russia’s military operations in support of the Assad regime. Officially, that area was meant to curtail freedom of movement for the remnants of ISIS, but happily for US interests, it also overlaps the Baghdad-Damascus Highway, a key arms trafficking avenue for Tehran.
It’s safe to say Tower 22 has a logistics role in supporting Al-Tanf, the existence of which is, and always has been, problematic for Tehran. Again, the deconfliction zone around the base obstructs a crucial land resupply route to Hezbollah. Of course, Iran hasn’t had any trouble getting arms through Syria to Lebanon, which means the risk-reward for the US of maintaining Al-Tanf is debatable. But regardless, Iran would rather it wasn’t there.
As tipped here on Sunday evening when the US first disclosed the one-way drone attack on Tower 22, the incident was surely the work of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a confederation of PMF militias loyal to Iran. They claimed the attacks officially a few hours later, but didn’t mention Tower 22 specifically. The umbrella group includes Kataib Hezbollah and Al-Nujaba, which is active in Syria.
The idea that Kataib Hezbollah and Al-Nujaba have operational independence from the IRGC, and specifically from the Quds, seems laughable in the context of an attack on the living quarters of a US base in Jordan. (Note the emphasis.)
Recall my description of Al-Nujaba’s website, where the group posted an overwrought obituary for a commander assassinated by a US drone in Baghdad earlier this month. The portal, I wrote, “features a hodgepodge of portraits depicting Qassem Soleimani and Mahdi al-Muhandis looking every bit like they visited a Glamour Shots together at an American mall in the 1980s.” My point: Al-Nujaba’s online presence is a virtual shrine to Soleimani and Muhandis. The former needs no introduction. The latter, who died in the same US drone strike that killed Soleimani, was an advisor to the Quds and founded Kataib Hezbollah. He was a legend in his own right. And his army is the most prominent of the IRI militia.
In short, Iran has no plausible deniability when it comes to the groups that comprise the IRI, some of whom (and maybe all of whom) hold up Khamenei as their Supreme Leader. The only way it’s a stretch to say Esmail Qaani is the de facto commander of these groups is in the sense that Qaani’s operational competence is, by most accounts, so far short of that embodied by his legendary predecessor that it’s conceivable he’s not directly involved in the day-to-day particulars.
What’s not as conceivable, though, is the notion that any group operating under the IRI umbrella would attack a US base with the explicit aim of killing US soldiers without telling the Quds about it first, particularly when the outpost in question is on the Jordanian side of the tri-border.
None of that’s lost on US intelligence, or if it is, US intelligence isn’t very intelligent. That means it’s not lost on The White House either, which in turn means Joe Biden has a very difficult decision to make.
To be clear: Biden can’t bomb Iran. Notwithstanding Lindsey Graham’s exhortations, airstrikes inside Iran are a gamble too big to chance in an election year. But Biden can’t simply conduct token strikes on Kataib Hezbollah operations hubs either. That hasn’t proven especially effective. And the US already assassinated one Al-Nujaba deputy this month, to no avail in terms of deterrent effect.
All of that to say there aren’t many good options if there are any at all. I do wonder — and plainly, this isn’t any sort of exhortation to assassinations, it’s just me being curious — if the US and Israel have considered targeting Esmail Qaani (assuming he ever leaves Iran) and Hassan Nasrallah.
If that sounds exceptionally dangerous, that’s because it is. And if you’d be inclined to suggest targeting those two would materially increase the odds of a catastrophic outcome in the Mideast, you’re not wrong.
However, if the US learned anything from the strike that killed Soleimani and Muhandis four years ago, it’s that when push comes to shove, the IRGC is all bark and virtually no bite.
Another hawk who never saw combat screaming for war.
The return of the neocons? They did such a good job in Iraq post 9/11.
Agreed. At this point in time, we absolutely need Iran to control the various groups of thugs over there. Imagine the chaos without Iran in place!
The only viable long term solution is to start drilling for oil in the US, promote nuclear and pull our military out of anywhere in the ME, where we are not wanted.
If we want to continue to purchase oil from the ME until we have adequate nuclear in place; no problem- we can somewhat control the price by increasing domestic drilling ( sorry- but until we have nuclear- humans are going to be polluting the planet with carbon based fuels).
Worried about shipping lanes through the Red Sea? Some combination of money, shipping on a non-US registered ship or going around Africa are all viable options.
The similarities of Israel to South Africa back in the 1980’s/90’s, as apartheid was ending, are very similar. At some point, it is going to be impossible to enforce “rule of law” with respect to Israel’s GDP per capita of $54,660 compared to Palestine ($3,440), Iran ($4,200), Iraq ($5,900) or Jordan ($4,900), just to name a few. Especially given the population of Israel, which is 9.2M vs. 205M in just Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Syria, combined.
It is all about the money. Furthermore, sourcing oil from the ME instead of domestically in the US is not worth WW3.
Brent down from last close. Defense names mixed. Traders unmoved?
The US could move against Iran’s ship in the Red Sea that provides targeting information to the Houthis.
To your question about the “strangeness” (from your comment on the original article published right after the attack) it’s possible (and I mentioned this in January and February of 2020 before the pandemic took over every headline) that without Soleimani, some of these proxies might start to wing it. He’d show up, randomly, in Iraq, to check on stuff at times and in places where he wasn’t scheduled to show up. If you were a deputy (i.e., a field commander) in one of these militias, you might walk out of a tent one morning and there he’d be, shaking hands and doing that creepy side-eye thing where he’d raise one eyebrow halfway up his forehead, while the other one sat completely still. This is pure speculation on my part, but as far as pure speculation goes, I’m pretty confident that none of these militias are in awe of Esmail Qaani. That doesn’t mean they don’t want his money and support and so on, but I doubt seriously that these guys are terrified of Qaani showing up out of the blue on the front lines. I don’t think he does that, and I’m quite sure the militia don’t have to worry about Qaani personally executing commanders in the middle of the desert, which is something Soleimani certainly would’ve done if he thought somebody was jeopardizing Iran’s interests without permission.
Biden is trying hard to avoid escalating vs Iran and its proxies. Reportedly, he resisted the US military’s recommendations for larger strikes against the Houthis, until forced to accede by Houthis’ increasing attacks on shipping and Navy vessels. I imagine there have been urgent back-channel appeals to Iran by the US and others, including China.
If Iran’s proxies continue increasing attacks on shipping and US bases, then either i) assumptions about Iran’s motivation to avoid military involvement are wrong, ii) assumptions about the extent of Iran’s control over its proxies are wrong, iii) Iran is significantly miscalculating the US’ reaction, or iv) the US is willing to accept more hits on shipping and more casualties among US troops and potentially US Navy ships.
I don’t think iv) is likely, partly because its an election year and partly because I think Biden takes US casualties seriously. I don’t know enough about Iran to guess between i), ii), and iii). I think it is “strange” – a feeling I’m having more and more – to see defense names and Brent down on the weekend’s events. Maybe investors simply aren’t focused on geopolitical this week, given the packed economic/earnings calendar?
I’ve wondered if Israel would take the shot when it comes to Nasrallah–assuming they were provided the opportunity. You couldn’t kick the hornets’ nest much harder than that, and Israel might well be loath to invite that level of heat.
H-Man, assuming the players went out of control while being coached to play aggressively, not sure it is time to fire the coach until you deal with the players.
“Who will rid me of this priest ? ”
Of course they are running things.
I always felt the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a simple spelling mistake…..
I have always felt it was just a publicity play from DC to increase their leverage with the electorate. After all, we originally armed Hussein to face Iran as our proxy. After 9/11 we needed some way to placate the electorate with 2004 on the way. So we turned on our guy by naming him as a terrorist, when we knew all along it was the Saudis (our ally and second largest customer/supplier) who actually funded the 9/11attack and got a free pass.