I’m supposed to tell you the Houthis are poised to crash stocks. Or drive oil prices to $200. Or disrupt global shipping such that inflation takes off again.

I don’t regret the language I used to describe my raison d’être in 2016, when I decided to start writing for public consumption. The fate of markets is “inextricably intertwined with the ebb and flow of geopolitics,” as I put it seven years ago. And you really can’t “fully comprehend markets without a thorough understanding of concurrent political outcomes and societal trends,” as I insisted at the time.

But the truth is, I wrote that pitch knowing full well that in all but the most acute circumstances, most markets don’t give a single damn about geopolitical developments, and to the extent it’s possible to give less than no damns, that’s investors: So uninformed and unconcerned about the world that they’re capable of showing less interest than none.

With that in mind, I’m compelled to gently suggest that for all the fanfare around the Red Sea this week, the Houthis are just doing what any “good” Iranian proxy does: Engaging in mischief as part of Tehran’s ongoing efforts to prove something about the capabilities of its self-described “Axis of Resistance” which, loosely speaking, is the Shiite Crescent plus armed Palestine.

The Houthis do have domestic goals. Quite obviously. And they are keen to present themselves as something other than just another of Iran’s pet militias. But generally speaking, they act at Tehran’s behest. They may have operational freedom on a day-to-day basis, but anytime they engage in activities with the potential to cause an international incident, the Quds are behind it. The most spectacular example was, of course, the September 2019 attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais.

At the risk of trivializing the situation, this is a big gang war. Like all big gang wars, there are awkward alliances forged out of common enemies and overlapping interests. The Houthis are duty bound to take action in support of Hamas, and while most observers assumed any such action would be limited given the lack of a discernible objective (there’s not a lot the Houthis can do for Hamas), they’re still at it. Houthi drones and missiles can’t inflict actual damage on the state of Israel, but the group can disrupt traffic in shipping lanes through which some 12% of global trade passes. They’ve done that before. They’re reasonably adept at leveraging geography to cause a stir.

This week, amid the growing Houthi threat, BP, Maersk and other big names said they’ll avoid the Red Sea until it’s safe. That’s suboptimal, to put it mildly. Not using the Suez means ships will have to take longer routes and that means higher costs which, some worry, will eventually be borne by consumers.

And, so, the US strengthened its commitment to the Red Sea, where warships currently operate for defensive purposes, alongside British and French naval vessels. Lloyd Austin suggested a hodgepodge of other nations will join the initiative, which he described as an operation to ensure the “free flow of commerce,” and protect “innocent mariners” from violations of international law.

The Houthis swear their attacks on ships (which they initially indicated would be limited to vessels with ties to Israel) are a legitimate effort to secure relief for, and assistance to, the beleaguered populace in Gaza. Following the US announcement, the group said it intends to keep it up. One Houthi official unironically described the US Navy’s activities in the waterway as “an unjustified militarization.”

So, who cares? Well, not markets. Yet. And maybe not ever. While it’s true that oil prices are higher, this week’s gains come on the heels of a bear market plunge for crude as global demand concerns overshadowed both the Israel-Hamas war and OPEC+’s efforts to support prices. Stocks are at or near record highs depending on locale.

Circling back, I’m the guy who’s supposed to tell you all the ways in which Iran’s ragtag rebels in Sana can upset asset prices and disrupt global trade and commerce with disastrous macro consequences at a delicate juncture for Western investors, policymakers and politicians alike.

There’s some truth to that dramatized line. But the fact that I wrote it in the space of five seconds speaks to how many times I’ve written it (or some version of it) before. What does that tell you? (Don’t answer that. It’s a trick question.)

Is it possible the Houthis overreach, triggering a market-moving series of events? Sure. Is it likely? Not especially, no. The US has backchannels with Tehran (and the Houthis for that matter), and don’t forget: Diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran were provisionally restored this year at the urging of Xi Jinping. MBS was in contact with Ebrahim Raisi in the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas attacks and Faisal Bin Farhan, the Saudi foreign minister, sat down with Hossein Amirabdollahian in Geneva earlier this month. In August, Amirabdollahian met with MBS in Jeddah.

The Saudis don’t want to get back into the kind of daily tit-for-tat with the Houthis which came to characterize one of the world’s longest-running conflicts prior to a fragile ceasefire. Riyadh also won’t want to be seen as participating in any sort of military action that could be construed as support for Israel while the war’s still going on in Gaza. The same goes for Arab states in general. So, the US probably won’t be able to count on much help from Washington’s regional allies when it comes to deterring the Houthis this time.

Still, everyone (including Tehran) knows closing off the Red Sea to commercial shipping for a prolonged period is a non-starter. In the interim between now and whenever key players decide enough is enough, the Arab states will (I suppose) just let the drama play out as it will, where that means the Houthis provoking the US Navy. A retaliatory US strike could conceivably be leveraged by the group for propaganda purposes, either in the information war around the conflict in Gaza or to further legitimize the movement.

Whatever the case, I don’t see a direct path from the Houthis’ latest “naval exercises” to an acute market event. I could, of course, be wrong. That happened once believe it or not. But if you’re looking for geopolitical black swans — the kind that can splash down overnight and trigger an instantaneous, March 2020-style bear market — I don’t think you’ll find them in the Red Sea. Or at least not right now.