Israel wanted to kill Bagher Ghalibaf. And the IDF knew his “coordinates.” But Donald Trump said no.

That’s according to Reuters, and it underscores what, by now, scarcely needs additional confirmation: Ghalibaf’s acting head of state in Iran. Moreover, he’s angling to become the country’s post-theocracy strongman and the head of a de facto military dictatorship.

On January 14, amid a worsening crackdown on anti-government demonstrators, I described this outcome as “the only possibly-viable option for preserving the regime.”

“Long-time [Qassem] Soleimani friend and current Speaker of Parliament Bagher Ghalibaf [could] convince everybody to let him run the country as a quasi-elected, military-aligned, non-clergy hardliner,” I wrote.

I also called that “a purely speculative long shot,” but it became eminently more plausible following the assassination of Ali Khamenei, the apparent incapacitation of his son and heir, and the ensuing deaths of more or less everyone with enough IRGC clout and political capital to keep the situation from unraveling.

And yet because Ghalibaf’s a blowhard and hardliner prone to making all sorts of threats against Israel, I warned repeatedly in recent weeks that the IDF would almost surely assassinate him. Apparently, his days were indeed numbered until Pakistan implored Trump to intercede in the interest of preserving negotiations mediated by Islamabad.

“The Israelis had their coordinates and wanted to take them out,” a Pakistani source told Reuters. “Them” refers to Ghalibaf and foreign minister Abbas Araghchi. “We told the US if [Ghalibaf and Araghchi] are also eliminated, there is no one else to talk to, hence the US asked the Israelis to back off.”

That reporting adds depth to a short piece published in The Wall Street Journal, which said Wednesday that Ghalibaf was taken off the target list “for up to four or five days as Trump opens the door to high-level negotiations for ending the war.”

With allowances for the distinct possibility that Benjamin Netanyahu wakes up on the wrong side of the bed and decides he’s had enough of Ghalibaf’s taunting, Trump’s decision to extend the deadline on strikes against Iran’s energy infrastructure to April 6 can presumably be interpreted as an extension on the assassination reprieve for Ghalibaf.

When Reuters asked the IDF whether Ghalibaf’s safe for the time being, Israel was noncommittal. “[We have] a rigorous process before every strike,” a spokesperson said. “I’m not going to go into any specifics about potential targets.”

It’s becoming clearer by the day that Trump’s seriously entertaining the idea of Ghalibaf as a post-theocracy strongman for Iran. When Trump said Thursday that Iranian negotiators “are very different and ‘strange,'” the “strange” bit was a reference to Ghalibaf, whose refusal to publicly acknowledge ongoing negotiations — let alone any role in them — is galling for Trump.

But Ghalibaf has everything Trump likes in a leader. For one thing, he’s corrupt and prone to nepotism. When he was mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf allegedly facilitated the sale of government property to close friends at enormous discounts and was linked to an embezzlement scheme that diverted some $3 billion in municipal funds to a shell company run by the IRGC.

In his role as parliament speaker, Ghalibaf was accused of hypocrisy on several occasions when pictures purporting to show his wife and daughter on lavish shopping trips in Istanbul made the rounds on social media. Those images were a slap in the face for Iranians struggling to survive in the country’s collapsed economy, and made for a stark contrast with Ghalibaf’s suggestion that citizens should be content to “live simply.”

I could go on, but you get the point. Ghalibaf’s the quintessential example of the mafia-like corruption that defines the IRGC and everyone linked to it. Whatever his feelings about the Guards, Trump’s affinity for mob-style management is legendary and more importantly, it’s the cornerstone of his transactional political style.

Unlike, say, Araghchi and the feckless Masoud Pezeshkian (who may as well resign and try to get asylum somewhere), Ghalibaf’s capacity to command the IRGC in a post-theocratic system isn’t in question. Don’t let his civilian government roles fool you into believing Ghalibaf’s some sort of technocrat: He’s IRGC through and through.

Indeed, Ghalibaf’s IRGC resume is unequaled among the still living. He joined up at 20 and spent eight years as a commander during the war with Iraq when he forged his lifelong friendship with Soleimani. He also led the Basij for a time.

Ghalibaf was among the IRGC commanders who signed a letter to then-President Mohammad Khatami in 1999 when student protests threatened to spiral. The gist of the letter was, “Get it under control, or we will.” That letter was also signed by its author: Qassem Soleimani.

Ghalibaf, who at the time was serving as commander of the IRGC air force, took matters into his own hands. Literally. On his own account, Ghalibaf drove into the crowds on a motorcycle and beat students with a club.

Desperate times call for desperate measures, I suppose. As Ghalibaf later explained, when social order’s threatened, “somebody has to be on the street with a stick, even if that someone’s a general.”

Again, that’s just the sort of thing Trump respects. In his own mind — and probably on the next edition of his NFT trading cards — Trump is that guy. The leader who rides through protests on a Harley and clubs demonstrators to death.

Ghalibaf’s a principlist on paper, but he has no principles. He’s often described as “close to Mojtaba Khamenei” which is true, but it’s worth noting that historically, Mojtaba worked as a key enabler of Ghalibaf’s corruption. And was a key source of support for his multiple (failed) attempts to win the presidency at the ballot box.

Indeed, a diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks once described Mojtaba as “an advisor” to Ghalibaf. (Context matters: The implication certainly wasn’t that the younger Khamenei was subservient. The word “advisor” didn’t carry a hierarchical connotation in that cable. The point was just that Mojtaba was someone Ghalibaf could count on. For advice, for money and, presumably, for a good word in with the big man.)

This is a critical juncture for Ghalibaf and for Iran. If Ghalibaf negotiates an end to the war and manages to do so in a way that fosters grudging respect from Trump (which isn’t difficult to garner if you’re a strongman), he can absolutely run that country as a de facto dictator with Mojtaba, assuming he’s alive, allowed to carry on as a spiritual figurehead.

Other than a failed state / civil war scenario, that’d be the worst-case for the Iranian public, because it’s antithetical to democracy. Although the economic plight of the average person would likely improve, probably not by enough to make up for the sundry pitfalls of repression.

From America’s perspective — or at least from America’s perspective under current management — a Ghalibaf Iran isn’t the worst-case. It’s by no means a best-case, but considering no one can even define “best-case,” Trump would take it. Gladly, I dare say.

As far as the rest of the region, no one in the Sunni monarchies would be thrilled with the prospect of a Ghalibaf Iran. He’d be easier to deal with than the regime with which he’s synonymous to the extent Ghalibaf would preside over a foreign policy that prioritizes self-interested economic transactionalism, but he’d be abrasive on friendly days and antagonistic on all the other ones.

This should go without saying, but Ghalibaf isn’t going to disavow the militarism that came to define Ali Khamenei’s regime. He’d be a de facto military dictator, after all. And considering Ghalibaf’s reverence for Soleimani, it’s exceedingly unlikely he’d abandon the proxy networks, nor does it seem realistic to believe that Ghalibaf would scrap the IRGC’s ballistic missile program.

But he doesn’t have to do any of that. Not publicly, anyway, and not as far as Trump’s concerned. All Ghalibaf needs to do is engage on the nuclear program, open the Strait and promise to stop firing missiles and drones at Iran’s neighbors, which isn’t a tall ask: Iran’s only attacking the Sunni states because it is itself under attack.

Ghalibaf will swear to his dying days that he’s committed to the Revolution, but his every word and deed going back three decades suggests he’d be just fine accepting a scenario where he and the Guards sell the clerics down the river in exchange for a chance to run an even bigger racket than the one they already have.

Here, sitting in the IRGC’s lap, is a chance to skim from an energy sector that’s suddenly unsanctioned and reconnected to the global financial system, which is to say officially allowed to transact in US dollars. The flow of FDI into Iran in a post-theocracy, unsanctioned environment would presumably be sizable. And the country needs a lot of infrastructure modernization.

The Guards, and Ghalibaf, could take a cut of every, single dollar. All they have to do is trade fundamentalism for transactionalism, and even there only privately. No one expects a public disavowal of the Revolution. And anyway, actions speak louder than words.

There are three outstanding questions. Do the Guards see this opportunity for what it is? Will Ghalibaf take the deal he’s implicitly being offered by Trump? And, most importantly, will Israel ultimately decide to veto this burgeoning arrangement with a missile?

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