Donald Trump’s probably going to bomb the Venezuelan mainland. By the time you read this, he might’ve already done it.
The Pentagon’s excuse is the same as it is for strikes on boats in the Caribbean: Drugs, and specifically drug trafficking.
It’s not a lie, but it’s not the truth either. Sure, the Nicolás Maduro regime’s involved in the cocaine trade, but bombing the country’s ports and airfields isn’t going to result in a meaningful reduction of cocaine flows to the US.
For one thing, it isn’t even clear that Colombian cocaine departing from Venezuela is destined for America in the first place. It could be going to Europe. But even if you assume all of it goes to Florida via the Caribbean Islands, that’s not even 10% of documented cocaine movements, according to the DEA.
The map above gives you a sense of these routes and how heavily they’re trafficked (no pun intended). Do note: That’s a US government graphic. Nicolás Maduro might’ve used it as a propaganda device, but it was originally published in the 2020 installment of the DEA’s national drug threat assessment.
If you read “Dope,” you know the story: It’s the Ecuador connection that matters. If Trump were seriously interested in curbing the cocaine trade, he’d be focused on the Pacific Ocean not the Caribbean Sea.
Relatedly, the notion (and this is implicit in Trump’s obsession with the Caribbean, whether he realizes it or not) that Florida gangs with cartel connections are a meaningful source of the US’s Latin American cocaine supply is farcical, even as Florida naturally boasts a lot of cocaine seizures.
Are there direct representatives of Colombian suppliers in Florida in the year 2025? Maybe? That’s a question. And I actually don’t know the answer. I mean, yes, there’s probably a guy somewhere and he probably facilitates transactions with gang leaders in the state, but whoever that guy is, he’s not Griselda Blanco. And there’s nothing like the Cali Cartel in modernity. Never say never, but those days are over in Florida. This isn’t 1980.
The number of US drug wholesalers with direct access — i.e., access not mediated by the Mexican cartels — to a Colombian cocaine supplier is zero, or may as well be zero. The barriers to entry for American cocaine entrepreneurs with designs on becoming freelance, unaffiliated kingpins are as myriad as they are insurmountable.
In the simplest terms: There’s no such thing as “cutting out the middleman” anymore, and the middlemen are, almost exclusively, the Mexican cartels, not any Venezuelans. If you don’t believe me, go out and try to buy, say, 50 kilos of cocaine and tell me whether you meet any Venezuelans along the way.
I’ll save you some trouble (and very likely your life): You won’t meet any. Venezuelans I mean. You’ll meet a succession of African Americans and then, ultimately, a Mexican or someone who represents a Mexican. Again: It’s the Mexican cartels who coordinate and control the vast majority of wholesale cocaine shipments into the US, and those shipments transit the Southwest border. Period.
Everyone knows that, including and especially Trump. How many times has he brought up using the US military against Mexican cartels over the past nine years? A lot. Once every couple of months at least. And his obsession with the southern border is nothing short of pathological.
So, cocaine as an excuse to bomb Venezuela is a red herring, and that’s being generous. A more accurate description calls it a bald-faced lie. The Trump administration’s leaning on a flimsy narrative that holds up the so-called “Cartel of the Suns” — a loose confederation of Venezuelan military personnel, government officials and Colombian go-betweens — as a major national security threat. Like a lot of Trump narratives, that’s cartoonish even as caricatures go.
Note also that cocaine isn’t even the problem in America. It’s a problem. But it’s not the problem. When was the last time you read a news story about the crack epidemic? If you’re younger than 50, the answer’s probably never. Now when was the last time you read a news story about fentanyl? Probably today.
I don’t care what this White House subsequently claims, there’s no evidence — none — to suggest the Maduro regime is a major supplier of fentanyl. Marco Rubio this month described Venezuela as “a narco-state run by a cartel.” That simply isn’t true. Maduro’s a moron first, a dictator second, an ideologue third and a drug dealer sixth or seventh. Dictators cut off from hard currency will take dollars wherever they can get them. And cocaine, like every other valuable commodity on Earth, is generally invoiced exclusively in US dollars.
When Rubio describes the Maduro government as “the al-Qaeda of the Western Hemisphere,” he’s trafficking in ridiculous hyperbole. Maduro’s a lot of things, none of them good, but “terrorist” isn’t one of them. There’s a difference between one who terrorizes and a terrorist. Maduro is certainly the former. He’s not the latter.
As discussed at some length here, Trump’s adopting an interventionist approach to Latin America, and he’s made it abundantly clear over the past two months that he intends to oust Maduro in Caracas as part of his strategy for the region. Venezuela’s obviously defenseless in the face of a US military which applies itself. If Trump is indeed determined that Maduro’s gotta go, and that determination manifests in an aggressive regime change campaign which includes airstrikes and, say, a naval blockade, well then there’s a decent chance Maduro will fall.
But, as discussed here previously, the best way to effectuate a change of government in Caracas is simply to give Maduro and his inner-circle some kind of off-ramp, where that means a one-way ticket to a beach and enough dollars to last them. Because in any melee catalyzed by a US military campaign to remove Maduro by force, innocent people in Venezuela will be maimed and killed, probably by the hundreds if not by the thousands. Maduro will fight back, not against the US military, but rather against anyone who tries to capitalize on the situation to overthrow him.
Bottom line: This idea of Trump’s — strikes against military assets on the Venezuelan mainland which the Miami Herald said on Friday are likely imminent — is a bad one. Even if it ends like Trump imagines it might, the interim period of chaos and strife will be highly unpleasant for locals who, while surely desperate for change, would probably tell you they’d rather their deliverance not come from the skies in the form of US warplanes dropping bombs.
I’ve always assumed this Venezuelan venture is about the oil, not the drugs.
Trump’s style of authoritarianism is to take the first step and, if no one yells too much, then take the second. So just start taking out a few boats. There’s not too much pushback because how is anyone going to pushback. All they can do is make a fuss in the media, but other than that there really isn’t much leverage anywhere (amazing how much taking of life the US is free to do outside its borders). Phase 2 might be a CIA targeted assasination by smart bomb. It might actually work if Trump’s buddy Bibi lends a hand. Voila, regime change and no one is going to complain even, judging by Gaza standards, if there is collateral damage. And Trump gets a secondary boost because he’s able to push Epstein further towards ancient history. As much as I dislike these people, you have to admit that the Project 2025 rollout is going well. Librarians thinking ahead should save some room next to Mein Kampf.
I will admit to feeling conflicted about this. Having been born in Venezuela and still maintaining a close connection with people there (family and folks that work for me), I can attest to the following: the triumvirate of power in Caracas, composed by Maduro, Diosdado Cabello and Padrino Lopez are definitely involved and facilitating drug traffic but they are not the Western Hemisphere Al Qeada as you point out, far from it. Also, most cocaine transiting through Venezuela is indeed destined for Europe and mostly intended for distribution by the Ndragheta in Calabria and from there to the rest of the old continent. That said, I know from folks connected to the regime that Maduro has been offered an off ramp more than once and declined, same for Diosdado, who many see as the actual power behind Maduro. They decided to call Trump’s bluff, I don’t blame them because I also thought it was a bluff. Now it looks like actual military action will happen.
I can also attest to the fact that most people in Venezuela will welcome a strike against the regime and someone hurting Maduro, at least so long as they do not fall victims to any military action. I feel pretty confident predicting that if (when) Maduro falls there will be major celebrations in Caracas, Maracaibo, Valencia and every major city in the country, what comes after will likely not be pretty, but things in Venezuela are essentially unsustainable already, the regime has stayed in power using increasing violence and repression against any opposition and lately against citizens in general. I despise what Trump represents and how he is dismantling the US, and there is no honest rational basis for an invasion or an attack, but at this stage if something good comes out of Trump’s daily madness and somehow Maduro and his cronies pay for their campaign of crime and misery against their own people I will for once celebrate. I have zero sympathy for Maduro and his clan, if he is reduced to dust Soleimani style by a US drone the planet will be marginally better, so will Venezuela, even if it does not last for long.
Nothing beats an insiders view. Any thoughts on how a power vacuum there might eventually be filled?
I am less concerned about a power vacuum than the ability of a legitimate government to maintain stability and peace. There is actually a network of people, business folks, and even individuals currently in the payroll of the regime that have been preparing for a transition, the leader of this group is the recent peace Nobel laureate Maria Corina Machado. My best guess is that the guy who actually won the elections last year (Edmundo Gonzales) will initially assume power and include Machado in any transition government, she will eventually become president. I have to assume (not a safe assumption given we are talking Trump) that if the US really intends to effect regime change that they will coordinate with Machado and Gonzales. There is also a significant presence of advisors and support already in Venezuela (or ready to arrive on short notice) from El Salvador and Argentina, a lot of former and exiled Venezuelan opposition activists work for Bukele and Milei. The real problem is that Venezuela is a failed state, even Maduro and the regime do not control all areas of the country, they control the cities, but in rural areas, poor neighborhoods and in the amazon actual crime gangs have more power. Tren de Aragua is not fictional, they do exist and control portions of the country, and they do not respond or take orders from the regime, even if they collaborate for convenience and to facilitate criminal enterprises, like cocaine flow. Anyway, once Maduro is gone Machado will have to deal with these lawless, well armed and organized crime syndicates, it could get really ugly.
Thank you for your insight.
Agree. Very insightful. I learn more from H’s articles and the commentary than I do from mainstream sources.
My thought was that Trump going to war with Maduro was a way to distract voters from what’s going on at home that does not reflect well on him.
Singer & Citgo
Singer originally backed Rubio 2016
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/measure-allow-foreign-military-bases-ecuador-fails-vote-2025-11-17/