Jerome Powell said words on Wednesday afternoon. Some of them were meaningful.
The Trump administration’s tariffs, Powell told an event hosted by the Economic Club of Chicago, are “likely to generate at least a temporary rise in inflation.”
“At least.” Those two words matter, as they suggest the Fed’s no longer prepared to write off the levies as unlikely to create anything more than a “transitory” uptick in price pressures or a one-off increase in the price level.
Earlier this week, Chris Waller, who previously downplayed the potential impact of the tariffs, conceded that the duties, as announced on April 2, constitute “one of the biggest shocks to affect the US economy in many decades.” That’s saying something considering “many decades” is a period that includes a pandemic and the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Waller laid out two scenarios in his address to the CFA Society, a “large” tariff outcome and a “small” tariff eventuality. Under the former, Waller assumed the average US tariff rate stuck at “around 25%” until the end of 2027, which he said would be necessary if the goal really is to “remak[e] the US economy into one that produces a larger share of the goods it consumes.”
In that “remake” scenario, which Waller tacitly suggested may be infeasible, growth would “slow to a crawl” and the jobless rate would rise “significantly,” as would inflation. Under the more benign, “small” tariff scenario, which assumes a 10% average rate, negative outcomes would be attenuated.
In his speech, Waller “went there,” so to speak, where that means he suggested, quite explicitly, that even in the “large” tariff scenario, the impact on inflation would be “temporary.” Here’s what he said:
Yes, I am saying that I expect that elevated inflation would be temporary, and “temporary” is another word for “transitory.” Despite the fact that the last surge of inflation beginning in 2021 lasted longer than I and other policymakers initially expected, my best judgment is that higher inflation from tariffs will be temporary. If this inflation is temporary, I can look through it and determine policy based on the underlying trend. I can hear the howls already that this must be a mistake given what happened in 2021 and 2022. But just because it didn’t work out once does not mean you should never think that way again.
He went on to use a football analogy to explain himself. I’ll spare you.
Powell seemed less sanguine on Wednesday, but he avoided doomsaying. The inflationary effects of the tariffs could well “be more persistent,” he warned, before reiterating familiar talking points about “avoiding that outcome” by working to “keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored.
“The tariffs, he said in the Q&A in Chicago, were larger than the Fed expected “even in our upside case,” and he was keen to note that if the pandemic taught us anything, it’s that supply disruptions “can take time to resolve.”
He cautioned that the effects of the administration’s trade policy are likely to move the Fed “away from” its goals, which could find themselves “in tension,” as the growth drag from the tariffs begs for rate cuts while the inflationary read-through argues for policy restriction. “If that were to occur,” Powell said, “we would consider how far the economy is from each goal, and the potentially different time horizons over which those respective gaps would be anticipated to close.”
In other words: If the dual mandate ends up in tension, the Fed’s actions will depend on which is worse, the growth outlook or the inflation situation. For now, he told the audience, the goals aren’t clashing given that the US labor market’s still in a good place.
This feels gratuitous, but I’d be remiss not to note (again) that the University of Michigan five- to 10-year inflation expectations series Powell put so much emphasis on in June of 2022 when explaining the Fed’s decision to up the rate-hike ante to 75bps is now unglued entirely, having printed a harrowing 4.4% in the preliminary read for March. The year-ahead (i.e., 12-month) series in the same survey rose to 6.7%, the highest since the early 80s.
Powell played down those readouts at the March FOMC meeting. At a subsequent speaking engagement, he seemed less sure of himself, and it’s a good bet that if he wasn’t worried about the Michigan prints last month, he is now. For his part, Waller this week said he doesn’t put much stock in household inflation expectations, preferring market-based measures instead. (Because who cares what households think?)
On Wednesday, Powell was asked about concerns the Fed might cut access to dollar swap lines under pressure from Trump. He denied that, saying the Fed “absolutely” stands ready to provide dollars overseas if needed, and reminded anyone listening that supporting dollar funding markets is ultimately in the public interest.
Commenting on recent volatility in financial assets, Powell said markets are “struggling with a lot of uncertainty,” and “functioning about as you’d expect them to” under the circumstances. He used the word “orderly.” I’m not sure if that’s entirely apt.
As usual, Powell was compelled to reassert the Fed’s independence, which is “a matter of law.” Fed officials, he reiterated, “are not removable except for cause.”
The context this time is a highly contentious legal debate over Trump’s authority to remove agency heads, and whether any such authority, if granted (“acquiesced” is probably a better word) by the Supreme Court, could be applied to the Fed.
That’s a story all its own. Suffice to say some Republicans are trying to craft an exception for the Fed Chair that would safeguard monetary policy independence while giving Trump broad leeway to remove other agency heads at his discretion.
Coming back to tariffs, Powell stated the obvious: There’s no modern precedent for duties the size of those Trump’s proposing, threatening and implementing.
In the closing statement of his prepared remarks, Powell quoted one of history’s greatest Chicagoans: Ferris Bueller. “Life moves pretty fast,” he said. “For the time being, we are well positioned to wait for greater clarity before considering any adjustments to our policy stance.”


and market drops further
Feel like these too many discussions of inflation and inflation expectations tend to gloss over a couple factors I think are important. First, once prices overcome their existing inertia and start moving around, they tend to keep moving around, albeit almost always faster on the way up than on the way down. And second, changing prices has never been easier on the retail level of this economy. No more forcing the most junior employee to put down the broom and find the pricing gun. Amazon doesn’t even need to involve a person anymore.
That’s two very good observations. Thanks. The last one, for an old fart like me, especially. I’ve never thought about the fact that price elasticity also includes at some level how quickly one can, physically, change a price on the shop floor. And the comparative advantage to be had in doing that.
Sadly, while the Fed is independent by law, Trump clearly feels that he is absolutely immune from any law or court in the nation. Not only can he shoot a citizen on Fifth Avenue. He can shoot a cop anywhere he wants.
If Trump watched Powell, or hears what he said, he’ll blast him in all caps before the end of the day. Powell was straightforward (for a Fed Chair, anyway) and, at least implicitly, said what many experts and a few others are starting to realize: Trump is causing a historic mess in the financial system that risks undermining stability in every conceivable way. Trump won’t be able to contain his fury.
The release notes mentioned a great Chicagoan Ferris Bueller…
If 25% global tariffs are maintained through 2027, recession and demand destruction may well make inflation “transitory”. Waller, Powell etc clearly know that is among the possibilities, but are not going to say it.
Anyway, probably needs to be (much?) longer than that.
Look how long it takes to build manufacturing facilities, obtain and install machinery, hire and train workers, for sophisticated large scale manufacturing.
TSM was considering/planning Arizona fabs for several years, announced its decision in 2020, and initial production is just now starting. TSM is highly profitable and able to self-fund the project. As the largest fab customer with the largest fab project, it had first call on the supply chain. Still took 5 years, or 10 if you count decision-making and planning.
Suppose every US manufacturing company tries to do the same, all at once? Including ones that are financially weak, either intrinsically or due to tariffs/recession (think automakers). Including ones without much access to financing (think small/medium businesses). Including ones that have to create a highly automated process because the manual process used in EM won’t work here (think AAPL). Including ones dependent on specialized machinery in short supply (anyone planning to use lots and lots of industrial robots) or skilled labor in short supply (many) or simply “labor” in a country without immigration (everyone) or construction/engineering and power and infrastructure (everyone).
So, assume 10 years of 25% tariffs and reshoring effort, what will the result be by 2035?
Hard to imagine, because the premise implies other things beyond just the industrial economy and you have to figure out how they play out. What does the world look like after a decade of US economic/tariff war on everyone else. What does the global financial system look like. How has the US internally maintained this policy.
Perhaps you end up with a country that does, indeed, manufacture more of what it consumes and has grown manufacturing jobs by half; has lost a larger number of service jobs and is consuming less than before after a long grinding recession; having thrown off all traces of “exorbitant privilege” but grown debt/GDP for a decade is enjoying 7-10% cost of capital; and has long ceased to be a democracy, or has somehow convinced voters that wearing patched and mended (but all American-made!) clothes and living in their (all American-made!) cars is what winning looks like.
Gosh I think I just described the USSR.
And most of the sophisticated equipment required to run the factories if you wanted to on-shore manufacturing are produced overseas (as subject to the same tariffs).