There was more disappointing economic news out of China on Tuesday. No one should be surprised.

You know the story. Or if you don’t, you haven’t been paying very close attention. Headed into 2023, the consensus macro narrative revolved around the notion that the Chinese economy was poised for a robust recovery coming out of “COVID zero,” while the US economy was likely to decelerate or even slip into recession, possibly as soon as H1.

Suffice to say things didn’t go according to plan. In fact, the opposite happened. There was no Chinese recovery to speak of, and the US economy didn’t just skirt a recession during the first half, it outperformed, and remains too hot for the Fed’s liking to this day (even as the labor market may finally be fraying around the edges).

In Beijing, the Party has promised and pledged to underwrite the recovery, but the piecemeal approach left investors unconvinced, and the data continues to suggest Xi should at least consider some kind of “big bang” push on both the fiscal and monetary fronts.

On Tuesday, markets learned that exports tumbled 14.5% in July, while imports dove 12.4%.

The release was accompanied by the usual hodgepodge of excuses from analysts searching for a silver lining. It’s always the same general pitch: “Well, in volume terms, this or that actually rose, and you have to take account of lower commodity prices when you look at the import side, and when you consider base effects…” And so on.

I’ll be the first to concede that such rhetoric emanates from analysts whose opinion on this particular matter is more informed than mine. (Or at least I hope their opinions are more informed than mine. After all, they analyze Chinese economic data for a living.) But the consensus figures against which the data is benchmarked often include their estimates. There’s something a bit odd about claiming that a set of data is actually “better than it looks” when it printed below your own guess and the guesses of your peers.

Bottom line: The trade data released on Tuesday was lackluster. The figure above is a “Me or your lyin’ eyes” kind of deal in the context of the “volume/price/base effects” spin which is now a mainstay of post-China data release financial media coverage, particularly that accompanying the monthly trade update. Exports to the US plunged 23% last month, and imports from the US dropped more than 11%.

Another line of reasoning says that however weak the data looks in 2023, it barely matters in the context of the pandemic export boom. That’s a useful consideration for the “big picture” crowd, and there are a number of lessons in that tale for Western nations and their newfound fascination with industrial policy. But if your job is to navigate today’s markets, where that means responding to the incoming data which is judged not against the bevy of excuses for any misses, but rather against the forecasts from the people making those excuses after the fact (i.e., consensus), yesteryear’s export boom isn’t especially relevant.

In any case, China has a demand problem. At home and abroad. Geopolitical tension doesn’t help. Later this week, CPI and PPI figures for July will probably show the world’s second-largest economy is now in deflation both at the factory gate and at the consumer level.

As for the nuance and excuses, do me a favor: Plot the CSI 300 and H shares against the S&P for this year and tell me what you see.