Turkey Tests Its Strongman

“Very ridiculous.”

That’s how Recep Tayyip Erdogan described the notion he might refuse to step aside after a lost election.

He was referring to this election, but the concern applies more generally. Pervasive worries about Erdogan’s commitment to the democratic process are a testament to Turkey’s authoritarian turn during the latter part of his rule. The fact that stories about Erdogan invariably include words like “rule” says a lot on its own.

Erdogan has dominated politics in Turkey for two decades. In the six years since a historic referendum cleared the way for the consolidation of power in a reconstituted presidency, he wielded control in a way that more often resembled the world’s autocrats and strongmen than any leader presiding over a real democracy.

On Sunday, he faced CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, an economist and civil servant who ran Turkey’s social security department in the 1990s before entering politics at the dawn of the Erdogan era. 2023’s election ended up a two-horse race. Muharrem Ince, who broke with CHP two years ago, dropped out last week amid a scandal and allegations he might’ve been hired to splinter the opposition vote. Ince ran against Erdogan under the CHP banner in 2018, the first election following the referendum. Erdogan won that contest easily in what he (amusingly) described as “a lesson in democracy for the rest of the world.”

With most of the votes counted Sunday, a runoff later this month was likely after another candidate, Sinan Ogan, captured more than 5% of the vote.

In many ways, Sunday’s election was history come full circle. Erdogan’s ascendance came on the heels of a financial crisis and deadly earthquakes which killed nearly 20,000 people in 1999. His AKP party, barely a year old, stormed to a resounding victory in 2002’s general election. Between them, AKP and CHP secured nearly every seat in parliament that year. Kilicdaroglu, freshly elected, became CHP’s parliamentary group leader.

Now, 20 years later, Erdogan is faulted both for an economic crisis and for a lackluster response to deadly earthquakes that left more than 50,000 people dead earlier this year. Kilicdaroglu’s pitch to voters in 2023 leaned heavily on promises to restore central bank independence and refashion an economic policy made in Erdogan’s image.

Erdogan’s efforts to commandeer the central bank are, by now, the stuff of legend. His unorthodox views on the interplay between rates, the lira and inflation are a wellspring of tragic punchlines. It’s a cult of sorts, although that probably gives it too much credit. It’s never been clear whether anyone, including Erdogan, actually believes the thesis which, to oversimplify, says that cutting rates is the best way to bring down inflation. For Erdogan, it’s politically expedient to pursue growth at all costs. If you’re a bureaucrat in an autocracy, it’s inadvisable to argue with the autocrat.

In September of 2021, when the rest of the world was gearing up for an aggressive rate-hiking cycle to combat inflation, Sahap Kavcioglu, a sycophant installed at the central bank after Erdogan ended a brief flirtation with sane policymaking under the hawkish Naci Agbal (who managed to deliver 875bps worth of tightening during his short-lived tenure), opened the door to an easing cycle. The rest, as they say, is history.

Inflation soared as rates fell, Kavcioglu blamed pandemic distortions and the war, Erdogan blamed the usual amorphous conspiracies and exasperated EM watchers marveled despairingly at Erdogan’s obstinance. Real rates in Turkey became an aberration, and Erdogan was forced to implement a complex scheme aimed at protecting savers’ deposits from runaway inflation.

Kavcioglu and Erdogan claim they’re attempting to “structurally and permanently” (to quote Kavcioglu) break Turkey’s dependence on foreign currency. The associated macroprudential initiatives, including the promotion of a somewhat nebulous whole-economy “solution,” are often couched in nationalistic terms. To the extent you can extract a semi-coherent strategy from Kavcioglu’s belabored attempts to elaborate, it’s not workable, feasible or realistic.

Kilicdaroglu wants to dismantle all of that, and restore market confidence by granting the central bank full independence again. He also promised to investigate economic mismanagement under Erdogan to determine what, exactly, went wrong and who, precisely, was responsible. I’m not sure there’s much point in that: We all know what went wrong and we all know who’s responsible.

Ostensibly, Turkey wants to be a true democracy again, and the West wants that too, particularly from a NATO member with a very large army. But replacing Erdogan is easier said than done, and not just because so many institutions (not to mention the media) are beholden to him. This is a dangerous world, and with (sincere) apologies to the millions of Turks who’ve suffered economically or otherwise during the country’s perilous turn for one-man rule, there are worse people in it than Erdogan.

Erdogan is a bona fide strongman who, notwithstanding his bellicosity and quarrelsome ways, isn’t a threat to the West. In fact, he’s an ally of the West, albeit an ally who isn’t shy about playing both sides (his decision to procure Russian missile systems was highly contentious, for example). Erdogan is one of the only people on Earth who can go into a room with Vladimir Putin and not come out compromised. During the Jamal Khashoggi drama, he took a serious run at undermining Mohammed Bin Salman, or as serious as such runs can be. If there’s any truth to the idea that a dangerous world calls for dangerous leaders, Erdogan is certainly dangerous.

In that regard, and many others, he isn’t replaceable. Although I wouldn’t presume to speak for voters in Turkey, rule-by-strongman, if it goes on for long enough, can create a sense of angst among the populace about life after the strongman. A majority may very well want Erdogan gone, but once an autocrat succeeds in becoming synonymous with a country, removing that person carries some risk of identity crisis.

I should be absolutely clear, though: Turkey isn’t some backwater frontier market. And it’s not Iraq, let alone Syria or Libya. Turkey isn’t at any risk of disintegrating without Erdogan, and indeed the opposition’s complaint is that it might eventually disintegrate with him, at least economically.

My point, rather, is that you don’t just vote away a strongman and then pivot seamlessly to a democratic renaissance complemented by the reinstitution of a virtuous meritocracy, managerial competence and real press freedom. It’s not that easy. And stepping into Erdogan’s foreign policy shoes is impossible. In addition to managing a delicate diplomatic dance with Putin, anyone who replaced Erdogan would need a strategy for dealing with Kurdish militants. Erdogan’s “strategy” is simple: Kill them, and not just in Turkey either. That’s not optimal by any stretch, but it’s a strategy.

It’s also worth noting that Kilicdaroglu represents a half-dozen parties. Keeping everyone happy and avoiding gridlock would be difficult, and policy mistakes would be exploited by Erdogan loyalists for propaganda purposes.

In the same remarks to the media mentioned here at the outset, Erdogan elaborated on how he’d handle a loss. “If our nation decides to make such a different decision, we will do exactly what’s required by democracy,” he said. “There’s nothing else to do.”