I think it’s fair to suggest that some observers believe Goldman has lost its way under David Solomon.

I also think it’s fair to suggest the firm’s Q1 results won’t do much to win over anyone who feels that way.

In a quarter during which JPMorgan, Citi and BofA all managed to deliver FICC beats amid a tumultuous environment for rates, Goldman’s traders fell short.

FICC revenue of $3.93 billion dropped 17% YoY, missing estimates in the process. That’s a bitter pill for the firm given big beats elsewhere.

Although Goldman, like the rest of the Street, saw higher revenues in rates, that was more than offset by “significantly” lower revenue in currencies and commodities. Equities revenue was $3.02 billion. Overall, markets revenue dropped 13% from the same period a year go.

In IB, advisory fell off a cliff thanks to an industry-wide drop in M&A (Goldman was still #1 in completed deals). Revenue of $818 million was slightly better than expected, but was nevertheless the lowest in more than two years and fell 27% YoY. Debt underwriting dropped 32%. Overall IB fees fell 26% versus Q1 2022, and the backlog decreased from Q4.

Together, markets and IB revenue was $8.44 billion. That was a miss. Consensus wanted $8.8 billion.

This was the second quarterly report compiled using the “new” corporate structure Goldman unveiled in October. Solomon is in the process of scaling back his consumer dreams. Goldman took a $470 million loss in Q1 on the sale of Marcus loans, and Solomon transferred the rest of those to held-for-sale. That move meant Goldman’s provision for credit losses was actually a net benefit in Q1. The actions on the Marcus loans led to a reserve reduction of $440 million, largely offsetting the sale loss, but that was itself “partially offset” by provisions tied to credit cards and “a term deposit” (I think we can speculate on what that is). Goldman also cited “macroeconomic and geopolitical concerns, and individual impairments on wholesale loans.”

Platform Solutions, home to the installment-lending firm Goldman bought in 2021, the bank’s credit card businesses, including Apple Card, and the firm’s corporate deposits operation, lost $306 million. Operating expenses ballooned 81% YoY (and 20% from Q4), but revenues more than doubled.

Last year, the segment lost almost $2 billion on a pretax basis. Q1’s loss was far shallower than expected, but I doubt anyone has a good handle on where this collection of businesses is headed, so I’m not sure how much stock to put in consensus. On the call, Solomon said he’s trying to sell GreenSky just a year after completing the acquisition.

Elsewhere, Goldman mentioned $355 million in real estate impairments, a 9% YoY rise in expenses, a 6% drop in headcount versus the end of 2022 and said net interest income was $1.78 billion, down from Q4 and well short of the $2.2 billion the Street expected. Deposits dropped $12 billion. On Monday, Apple launched a savings account product in partnership with Goldman.

The top-line was a miss. Firmwide revenue of $12.22 billion was $550 million short of consensus, but EPS of $8.79 was comfortably ahead of the $8.21 estimate.

These numbers looked untidy to me, for lack of a better word. This is a transitional period for Goldman, so I suppose that’s to be expected, but I’m not sure how much patience shareholders have left.

Solomon made it clear he understands the need to refocus on Goldman’s core competencies. The firm, he promised, is “executing our strategy to further grow our leading Global Banking & Markets and Asset & Wealth Management franchises.”

He called March’s banking sector turmoil “another real-life stress test.” It was, of course, Goldman which bought SVB’s AFS book last month and advised the failed lender on its ill-fated balance sheet restructuring effort.