If you were wondering just how pot committed the Kremlin is to Vladimir Putin’s imperialist fever dream in Ukraine, the answer is… well, suffice to say Moscow is all-in.
Or at least according to UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, who on Wednesday told the BBC that 97% of the Russian army is estimated to be in Ukraine.
Whether that’s strictly accurate doesn’t really matter. Even if Wallace (who denied reports he threatened to resign over a defense spending row) is off by 20pp, that’d still leave three-quarters of Putin’s military committed to an effort which, a year in, has yielded very little in the way of concrete results, unless you measure “success” in casualties, in which case the campaign is going swimmingly.
Officials in Kyiv are bracing for a fresh offensive along the front lines, where Russian forces have been unable to advance — they’re stuck in the mud, figuratively and literally.
“If 97% of the Russian army is now committed to Ukraine with a very, very high attrition rate, their combat effectiveness potentially depleted by 40%, and nearly two- thirds of their tanks destroyed or broken, that has a direct impact on the security of Europe,” Wallace remarked.
NATO defense ministers are in Brussels debating what else can be done to bolster Ukraine’s defenses. Finland and Sweden were invited. Wallace indicated the UK won’t, in fact, be sending fighter jets, or at least not soon. For now, everyone’s still talking tanks.
For investors, the calculus is characteristically cold. It’s not about human suffering in Ukraine, it’s about portfolios suffering from monetary policy tightening to curb an inflation impulse that was exacerbated by the war. It’s also about the psychological overhang of the conflict on market sentiment. And (crucially) it’s about the disconcerting prospect of higher long-term real rates to account for a new macro regime born not just of the pandemic, but of shifting geostrategic tides.
The word “Ukraine” came up nearly a dozen times in the latest installment of BofA’s Global Fund Manager survey. The share identifying geopolitical concerns as the top tail risk rose from January to 17%. Note that whether “inflation stays high,” the top tail risk, will depend in part on the evolution of geopolitics.
“China/Taiwan” is a major concern for investors. There’s every reason to believe Beijing sees Ukraine as a testing ground for assessing the West’s capacity and willingness to deploy financial and military assistance in the interest of deterring land grabs based on autocratic historiography.
Although fund managers by and large don’t know much about any of this, it’s worth noting that stewards of $850 billion in capital collectively cut their subjective odds of a peace agreement in Ukraine sharply this month.
You could argue that when a group of people predisposed to viewing the world through a “because markets” lens turn pessimistic about the odds of a market-friendly outcome, that’s when things are looking really grim.
The share of respondents to BofA’s poll who expect a truce this year dropped below 20% from around 35% in January, results released this week showed.
“Doubts continue to grow that a peace agreement in 2023 could end the military conflict [and] ‘geopolitics worsen’ is now the second-biggest tail risk for investors,” the bank’s Michael Hartnett remarked.
Unfortunately, world wars are difficult to hedge. Nuclear conflicts even more so.



If western countries deliver equipment and support to Ukraine, as promised in the spring/summer timeframe, it’s very likely the Russian armies will still occupy the same Ukrainian land that they hold today in the eastern and southern oblasts: Zaporizhzhya, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk. But with western tanks, Stryker vehicles, and Bradley fighting vehicles, the Ukrainians will make life for the occupiers extremely uncomfortable. The Russian tendency to run away from the fight will continue to embarrass the Russian leaders.
More importantly, Ukraine has also expressed a strong desire to retake Crimea, which strategically will be very difficult for the Russians to defend. With longer range western missiles, recently slated for delivery to Ukraine, the Kerch Bridge will be no more. Ukraine is very well likely to take Crimea this summer. By cutting off supplies to Crimea, it will be easier to occupy, while the provinces in the southeast will have more capacity for resistance. If I was the Ukrainian defense minister, I’d want F-16s to assert air dominance going into late 2023 for those southeastern provinces.
I expect the southeastern provinces to be returned to Ukraine by early next year, probably by force, not by Russian surrender. For me the bigger question is not the timing of the return, but the state of affairs in Russia itself. How will they swallow and digest such a spectacular loss? How long will Putin remain in power? Will they finally play the nuclear card? These choices and possibilities are a lot to digest.
The country will be, needless to say, a messy place. How will the Russian people react to losing the war and possibly facing the demise of their country? Will they pick up the thread of democratic thoughts they had in 1991? Will they try do it better this time?