One — perhaps the — key geopolitical question in 2023 is whether Moscow is overplaying Vladimir Putin’s purportedly “no-limits” strategic partnership with Xi Jinping.
Late in December, the two men held a video call which the Kremlin gleefully touted as evidence that Xi and Putin are still close despite China’s reluctance to publicly take sides in the Ukraine conflict. Note the emphasis on “publicly.”
What happens behind the scenes is the subject of considerable debate, and as discussed here, the US reportedly suspects China’s SOEs of funneling material support to Putin.
With that as the context, consider that according to The Wall Street Journal‘s documentation of records provided by Washington-based nonprofit C4ADS, China is indeed sending Moscow critical technology in apparent support of Russia’s war efforts.
“The customs records show Chinese state-owned defense companies shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology and jet-fighter parts to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies,” the Journal said, adding that “those are but a handful of tens of thousands of shipments of dual-use goods — products that have both commercial and military applications — that Russia imported following its invasion last year.”
The Journal cited specifics. Lots of them. In October, for example, a Chinese SOE sent more than a million in Sukhoi parts to a subsidiary of a sanctioned Russian defense company.
Apparently, Antony Blinken intended to chat with Beijing about the sanctions-busting shipments during his planned visit to China, but that trip was canceled because Blinken, like the rest of America, had a balloon party to attend.
The official customs records the Journal analyzed surely don’t include everything Moscow might be receiving from the Chinese, which means the evidence (assuming that’s what it is) probably just scratches the surface.
Of course, if China is arming (or “resupplying”) Russia through the backdoor, and the US is arming Ukraine, then the conflict isn’t a proxy fight between Russia and NATO. It’s a proxy war between the US and China. A deadly dress rehearsal, perhaps, for 2025.
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Good morning, Walt. Glad you’re exploring this question. Indeed, I’ve heard it said 2025 is the timing for China.
I do not feel very strongly about jumping into the Taiwan landscape to save them from the communists. The US position all along has been One China. The US has encouraged a peaceful transition, returning Taiwan to the Chinese. There will be an argument that American blood ought not to be spilled over an internal Chinese political matter. I believe that argument will stand. The businesses in Taiwan, like TSMC, ought to set up shop in the US and Japan (joining Ex patriot Jack Ma in Tokyo) if they truly wish to survive and flourish. They ought to begin that process, if they haven’t already, with the plant they are building in the US.
I believe the US and its partners in Asia will draw a line around the whole of China, including Taiwan. I believe we will all be very wise to settle for containing the Chinese within their formal borders, and keeping them away from Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, etcetera. Depending on China’s disposition after they assume control of Taiwan, keeping the Chinese away from US allies in Asia will be plenty to do.
I’m unaware of any US policy stance or action that shows the “US has encouraged a peaceful transition, returning Taiwan to the Chinese.” What has DoD or State or the WH said or done dating back to the 1980s that suggests the US believes a “peaceful transition” is even possible? One China attempts to show respect to China while implicitly if not explicitly recognizing Taiwan’s right to self-governance. Contradictory on the surface and in implementation? Yes. But no “peaceful transition” is possible absent a radical change in China’s political system and its perception of Taiwan. The Taiwanese appear to share this view: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/07/why-is-unification-so-unpopular-in-taiwan-its-the-prc-political-system-not-just-culture/.