Ali Larijani’s dead. Israel killed him in an airstrike Tuesday.

That means Mojtaba Khamenei better be alive. Because with Larijani gone, Iran’s leaderless if there’s any truth to rumors that the son’s liaising with the father, not penning speeches from a bunker.

It wouldn’t be quite right to describe Larijani as a peripheral figure prior to recent events, but it’s certainly fair to say his profile and portfolio grew commensurate with the death toll among the regime’s top ranks.

His resume’s a mile long. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he transitioned from the IRGC to government service and politics in the early 1990s.

Among (a lot of) other things, Larijani was propaganda minister twice, once for a few months during the earliest days of the Revolution and then for a decade after his military service, which ended in 1993.

In 2005, he succeeded Hassan Rouhani (the moderate former president) as head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, a role he held for two years before jumping into parliament, where he was speaker from 2008 until 2020 (that role now belongs to Bagher Ghalibaf, discussed here last week).

After two abortive attempts to mount a third run at the presidency (he ran in 2005, lost, then couldn’t get on the ballot in 2021 and 2024), he ended up back in the security council role, which he took over last summer following the 12-day war with Israel and the US bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites.

In the seven months since being reappointed Iran’s security chief, Larijani made himself indispensable, becoming ever closer to Ali Khamenei who he’d already served as an adviser in various capacities, both official and unofficial, for over two decades.

By the time the country erupted into protest in January, Larijani occupied a strange role: He was a sort of shadow president. Unlike Masoud Pezeshkian (the elected president), Larijani had real power by virtue of his proximity to Khamenei, who came to trust Larijani perhaps more than any other still-living senior regime figure.

Despite a pious background, Larijani could never be Supreme Leader. He’s not a Marja. (Cue Ray Liotta’s Henry Hill: “Jimmy and I could never be made. It didn’t even matter that my mother was Sicilian. To become a member of a crew, you’ve got to be 100% Italian so they can trace all your relatives back to the old country.”)

Of course, Khamenei wasn’t a Marja either, but it’s never been clear whether the constitutional amendment which removed that requirement was meant to apply forever, or whether it was a one-off favor to Ruhollah Khomeini, who insisted on Khamenei as his successor regardless of qualifications.

It anyway wouldn’t matter. Larijani’s Bachelor’s is in computer science. His PhD’s in Western philosophy. He’s a Kant scholar. (Seriously. He wrote three books on history’s most famous polymath.) I won’t pretend to be an expert on Islamic law, but I don’t think those are the type of credentials you need when your job description entails issuing fatwas.

Although Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, the notorious head of Iran’s judiciary, was the face of the January crackdown on protesters, Larijani was the guy making the calls.

He was also making calls (literally, on the telephone) to Iran’s regional go-betweens in Muscat and Doha, as well as coordinating fraught nuclear negotiations with the Trump administration. In addition, Larijani was a crucial diplomatic link between the regime and its two major-power allies in Moscow and Beijing.

Regular readers will kindly recall that I described Larijani’s successor as parliament speaker, the above-mentioned Bagher Ghalibaf, as a potential bridge to a post-Supreme Leader Iran. “In being a quasi-elected, military-aligned, non-clergy hardliner, he could likely keep the train on the tracks and forestall a descent into chaos in a post-theocracy scenario,” I wrote.

Except for the “post-theocracy” part, Khamenei might’ve had the same idea for Larijani. In entrusting him to run the country from a day-to-day perspective in the two months leading up to his assassination, Khamenei seems to have been preparing Larijani for a role as interim, de facto head of state following the inevitable “martyrdom” of the Khamenei family, clergy candidates for Supreme Leader and what remained of the IRGC high command.

Khamenei wouldn’t have wanted to leave the country to Pezeshkian, because that would be to concede the regime’s downfall. Nor, on some accounts, did he want to leave the country to Mojtaba, recognizing the irony in a movement which began as a revolt against inherited power passing a de facto dictator role from father to son.

Larijani, by contrast, could’ve preserved the regime in some form while adopting just enough in the way of flexibility and “moderation” (an extremely relative term in this context) to placate The White House.

Think of it this way: If there was going to be a so-called “Delcy scenario” in Iran, one of the two people who could play that role is now dead. The other, Ghalibaf, probably thinks his position in the civilian government means Israel won’t target him. That isn’t a safe assumption.

Given his role as security chief, Larijani’s assassination is easier to justify than a hypothetical strike on a sitting member of parliament. But on the off chance you haven’t noticed, the IDF doesn’t feel like it needs to justify anything anymore.

Do note: Larijani didn’t (let me unpack that for emphasis: did not) want to see Mojtaba ascend the throne. With allowances for a father’s affection, it’s possible that Larijani’s opposition reflected the wishes of Khamenei considering their close counsel over the latter’s remaining days.

But it doesn’t matter now, because Larijani’s dead. And so is Gholamreza Soleimani (no relation to the General, proper noun), head of the Basij. Israel killed him too on Tuesday.

I keep saying this, and I guess it’s never going to sink in completely for some readers, but that regime and its entire network from Tehran to Beirut, is compromised. Mossad and the IDF are going to keep assassinating people until there’s nobody left “worth” killing. It’s just that simple.

Commenting Tuesday on Larijani’s demise, the Israeli foreign ministry said “The Iranian people can only liberate themselves with external help.” To quote JD Vance for the second time in a week, “Have you said thank you once?”