By Thursday afternoon in the US, which is to say around 24 hours after Donald Trump surprised markets by announcing a “framework” for addressing his administration’s concerns about the future of Greenland, the outlines of a prospective intra-NATO accord were visible, albeit barely.

Although there are still far more questions than answers, and while key elements of the proposal remain contentious, particularly in Copenhagen, you can make out the scaffolding of an entente.

Naturally, Trump wants US missiles in Greenland, and he’s also pursuing sovereignty claims via US military bases, an idea with some precedent around the world, even if Denmark’s not especially keen on it.

From the limited information on offer, it sounds like Trump’s amenable to a rewrite of the 1951 “Defense of Greenland” agreement in lieu of US annexation.

It’s still not obvious why that agreement, which was updated in 2004 but still grants the US wide and virtually unfettered latitude for military operations, needs to be amended, though.

Here’s the relevant passage from the updated arrangement agreed two decades ago:

[T]he Government of the United States will consult with and inform the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Home Rule Government of Greenland, prior to the implementation of any significant changes to United States military operations or facilities in Greenland.

With the caveat that I’m no legal scholar nor an expert on treaties, all that says is that the US is obliged to give Nuuk and Copenhagen a heads up if the Pentagon wants to build something large or effectuate a meaningful change to its military posture.

I’ve read through half a dozen assessments of the US-Denmark arrangement and there’s no evidence that the US had reason to believe Denmark would obstruct American defense initiatives nor, as far as I can tell, was there any indication that Greenland’s push for independence somehow threatened the basic tenets of the existing security accord.

In other words (and to reiterate what I said first thing Thursday morning), this has very little to do with the logistics of mutual defense and almost everything to do with Trump’s William McKinley shtick and fondness for the late-19th / early-20th century brand of American power projection.

The new Greenland deal could include an expanded version of the linked 1951/2004 agreement, likely with language that insists on preserving US access regardless of whether Greenland one day becomes wholly independent.

An updated arrangement would also include a means by which America can assert formal sovereignty over small parts of Greenland. Simply put: US military bases would be American territory.

In theory, if there’s no check on how many bases the US can build and/or how large those bases can be, the US could lay claim to large swathes of Greenland, which is of course being eyed as an installation site for elements of Trump’s “Golden Dome” pipe dream.

In addition to dotting the permafrost with US bases, Trump wants mining rights to what’s under that permafrost. And guarantees that Russia and China won’t be granted any access to Greenland’s rare-earths.

Notably, none of that’s new. Every, single aspect of Trump’s “deal” was already on the table, either literally in Washington last week when Denmark’s envoys met with Marco Rubio and JD Vance, or figuratively during internal discussions in Brussels, where officials spent the better part of a year gaming out ways to placate Trump in the event he was serious about laying claim to the island.

Not surprisingly, Greenland’s premier doesn’t love the idea of the US building multiple bases that America can call US soil. “We’re ready to discuss a lot of things [but] sovereignty’s a red line,” Jens-Frederik Nielsen said Thursday.

Mette Frederiksen voiced similar sentiments. “We can negotiate on everything — political security, investments, the economy — but we cannot negotiate on our sovereignty,” she said.

I get the feeling that’ll end up being a distinction without a difference.