Xi’s Reopening Bull Market Crashes And Burns In 12 Months

This feels a little gratuitous, but I don't generally care. We're talking about an autocrat whose policies deserve to be derided. Chinese equities on Friday erased the entirety of the grand reopening rally which began to fizzle in February. The Mainland benchmark dipped below its October 31, 2022 closing level, and ended the day down 0.7% on the way to a terrible week. Sentiment is abysmal. Foreign investors have sold more than $22 billion in A-shares through the links since early August, t

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7 thoughts on “Xi’s Reopening Bull Market Crashes And Burns In 12 Months

  1. I am friends with a 35 year old Chinese woman who has lived in the US for 15 years.
    She was born during the “one child” policy era. Her mother had the foresight to make sure she learned English from a very young age and after graduating from college in China, she came to New York for graduate school, then stayed, worked and got married.
    She said most people her age would like to leave China- but not everyone wants to leave their family/friends. She also told me that although somewhat difficult, it is still possible to get money out of China and that most Chinese, of her age range, think that “Xi has lost it”.

  2. China’s equity market is entertaining. China’s debt market is maybe less entertaining but bigger/worse.

    Property developers have appx $2.5TR debt. About $0.2TR is offshore dollar bonds, of which about $0.1TR is in default. About $1.7TR is owed to banks, who have been “encouraged” by CCP to extend. Some more is owed to trusts and insurers, I’m not sure how able they are to extend and pretend.

    LGFVs reportedly have $9.0TR in debt, much being short-term. CCP is allowing some local govts to issue longer-maturity bonds to refinance their LGFV debt (seem to be a case-by-case policy) and encouraging banks to extend.

    CCP won’t permit rapid collapse/writeoff of this $11.5TR in developer + LGFV debt, but also won’t assume responsibility for it, so the can-kicking slow-mo workout may drag on the economy including banks for many years.

    I think everyone assumes the additional $5.9TR of household property debt (mortgages) is “safe”, but as long as the RE mood is sour/prices falling, the debt service (>20% of household income) may drag on consumer spending.

    Data from these links (credible news sources, but delete if inapprop)
    https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-troubled-property-sector-face-more-debt-defaults-2023-10-20/
    https://www.ft.com/content/f4382d3a-b423-4151-a204-8789960ff42a (citing GS report)
    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-27/china-starts-local-government-debt-swap-program

    1. I know. Isn’t that great? “Sir, I’m going to have to ask that you show us your pass.” “Excuse me?” “Your pass, sir.” “You know damn well who I am.” “Yes sir, but you specifically said nobody gets in without a pass.” “Listen, you’re either gonna let me in here or I’m gonn– you know what? Fine. Qin, where’s that fu–ing name tag? Let me have it.” pins on name tag “Are you happy now?” “Yes, that’s good. Nice to see you Chairman. You’re free to go inside now.”

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