One Man To Rule Them All

It’s official. Xi Jinping is still “King of China,” as Donald Trump famously put it. Xi’s reshuffled Standing Committee, unveiled Sunday, suggests five years of unswerving adherence to his policies, both domestic and abroad.

Xi’s pathbreaking third term has been a foregone conclusion for quite some time, so the 20th National Congress was really about assessing his commitment to the pursuit of what Western analysts view as an increasingly bellicose policy agenda.

I often hesitate when using words like “bellicose” and “belligerent.” My gravest reservations about Xi are related to the treatment of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and the institution of true one-man rule, not his Taiwan ambitions or the Hong Kong crackdown.

I should state the obvious about Taiwan and Hong Kong, although the main points scarcely need repeating.

Any attempt on Xi’s part to seize Taiwan by force would likely entail loss of life on a catastrophic scale, and even if it didn’t start a global conflagration, would forever occupy a dubious place in world history. In short, Xi would be gambling his place in history on what he views as a historical imperative, setting the stage for what could be a tragically ironic debacle.

In Hong Kong, he made democracy de facto illegal. There’s really no utility in employing euphemisms. Indeed, Xi didn’t last week when, during his opening speech for the Party congress, he said, of Beijing’s approach to the city following a period of unprecedented unrest, “the central government exercised its jurisdiction [and] ensured governance by patriots.” When the definition of patriotism is the sole purview of the central government, that’s not democracy.

But, as unpalatable to Western audiences as this most assuredly is (and I include myself among those for whom it’s unpalatable), the Taiwan situation isn’t perfectly analogous to Ukraine. And the US’s commitment to defending the island is inextricably bound up with economic self-interest and a visceral ideological aversion to Marxism or, as we’re calling it in this context, “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” I don’t pretend to know what an optimal approach is for the West when it comes to Taiwan, and indeed, the US’s “strategic ambiguity” is a tacit admission that Washington doesn’t know either. What I do know is that a military commitment to the island’s defense means that Xi can draw the US into an armed conflict with the PLA at a time of his choosing. That isn’t optimal, and no sane person would say it is. The stronger the PLA gets, the more untenable the situation.

As for Hong Kong, I’ll confess to being less sympathetic than most Western observers. My view is informed (or maybe misinformed is more accurate — I’m certainly open to that) by dozens of conversations with Western professionals in various industries who, prior to and during the most recent period of social unrest in the city, insisted it was a bastion of democracy and capitalism and that there was no reason to leave. I tried (I really did) to persuade at least one former friend otherwise because, with apologies, the idea that a bastion of democracy and capitalism can persist, mostly unfettered, adjacent to Xi, is laughable. The writing was on the wall. If you didn’t read it, that was your fault.

Additionally, no government (democratic, authoritarian or otherwise) is enamored with the idea of burning streets and prolonged, violent protests. Eventually, that sort of thing meets with some kind of government push back. In democracies, it’s typically the presence of law enforcement with a mandate to only engage protesters if absolutely necessary to protect life and property, as well as polite pleas from the executive for people to stop burning down their own cities. In authoritarian locales, it’s typically one warning from the government to cease and desist, followed by a crackdown. Frankly, it’s a small miracle the situation in Hong Kong didn’t spiral further out of control given the zeal of the protesters, the ideological support they garnered internationally and Xi’s pathological aversion to social unrest.

With all of that said, there are certain things you can’t do. Genocide is one of them. And many accounts of life in Xi’s “vocational education” camps in Xinjiang could serve as screenplays for horror films. Put simply: If such accounts are even half true (and we know they’re at least that) and China wasn’t China, it’s possible the West would’ve intervened militarily by now.

Another thing you can’t do is establish strict, one-man rule. Actually, you can, but it won’t end well. Modern examples of strict one-man rule not resulting in some sort of ruin are difficult to come by. You could argue that the Sunni monarchies are stable and generally prosperous if ludicrously unequal, but… well, suffice to say there are a lot of caveats. Turkey isn’t strict one-man rule, although it’s far too close for comfort. Iran is strict one-man rule, and it’s never worked out especially well. Russia is strict one-man rule, and it’s a hopeless oligarchy run by a mob boss. Venezuela is strict one-man rule and it’s Venezuela. North Korea is strict one-man rule and it’s North Korea. You get the idea.

With all of that in mind, Xi on Sunday unveiled a reconstituted Standing Committee comprised entirely of loyalists, after dropping several well-regarded moderates and a few household names in the West from the Central Committee on Saturday. Xi retained only Zhao Leji and Wang Huning on the seven-member body which runs the country.

Last congress, Zhao took the reins at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which oversees internal Party affairs. Zhao was Xi’s anti-corruption enforcer. He’ll probably head the NPC going forward. Wang is an academic ideologue with an uncanny knack for staying close to power. He’s an éminence grise — Tom Hagen if Tom Hagen were a political philosopher. In a parallel universe, Wang might be a capable advertising executive. He’s generally credited with crafting slogans including, not coincidentally, “Socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era.” Wang famously wrote “America Against America,” a volume which, unfortunately, seems to become more relevant all the time.

New additions to the Standing Committee include, most notably, Li Qiang, Party secretary of Shanghai. He’s No. 2 now, which means he’ll likely replace Li Keqiang as premier. Although he was criticized locally for the myriad inconveniences associated with this year’s draconian lockdown in the city, Li’s adherence to Xi’s “COVID zero” strategy seemingly paid political dividends. Of course, Li was already close to Xi, serving as his chief of staff for three years when Xi was Zhejiang Party chief.

Although the Shanghai role is most assuredly a platform from which one can rise to the top of the Party’s ranks (since 1987, only one Shanghai Party chief hasn’t made it to the Standing Committee, and Xi was briefly Party secretary of Shanghai), it’s rare for a presumed premier not to serve as a vice-premier first. In fact, it hasn’t happened in almost 50 years. That someone who oversaw the Shanghai lockdown which crippled the Chinese economy during the second quarter is set to replace a pragmatic premier who advocated loudly for official economic support to offset the drag from “COVID zero” is very notable, particularly given the apparent break with precedent in terms of promotion protocol. Li Qiang isn’t known to harbor any sort of progressive views on economic policy, although he does have an MBA.

The remaining three spots went to Beijing Party chief Cai Qi (a capable politician who presided over what I’ll call pseudo-lockdowns in the city without too much in the way of public discontent and managed the Beijing Winter Olympics as well as could be expected under the circumstances), Li Xi (Guangdong Party chief, longtime Xi friend and a man with ties to the historically important Yan’an) and Ding Xuexiang (a Xi tagalong who occupied a role similar to chief of staff). Ding never served as a governor or a provincial Party secretary. His prior position as head of the General Office made him king of the bureaucrats, though.

It’s exceedingly difficult to spin the new Standing Committee as anything other than a panel of committed loyalists, whose fealty to Xi will invariably supersede all other concerns in all matters, no questions asked. There’s no sense in which the shakeup can be construed as a positive development for markets, although that doesn’t mean analysts won’t try.

Xi gave another short address on Sunday. “China cannot develop in isolation from the world,” he said, adding that “the world’s development also needs China.”