Vladimir Putin is facing the very real prospect of defeat in Ukraine. Not just morally or relative to how the Russian military “should’ve” performed, but outright.
It may take six months or a year or longer. Or it may not. The Donbas line could fall. By Sunday, Ukrainian troops were “fanning out to search for Russian stragglers” in and around Lyman, which Putin’s troops abandoned just hours after the Kremlin claimed it as part of Russia following a series of farcical “referendums.” As The New York Times wrote, citing a Ukrainian police chief, “the city now lies largely in ruins, without electricity, water or regular food supplies.”
It’s impossible to overstate how tragically asinine this situation has become. The Ukrainian military encircled, then recaptured, a city in a region Putin said was Russia’s “forever” just a day previous. Russian troops, understandably fearing the worst, eventually just ran off into the woods, for lack of a more succinct way to summarize various accounts of the retreat, which the Russian military acknowledged, albeit not quite in those terms.
Ukraine’s armed forces have a habit of mocking their flailing Russian counterparts on social media. Last month, they tweeted an infographic tallying Russian losses with the caption “Numbers on the boards,” a reference to reputed kingpin Pusha T, a titan of 2000s-era American rap whose knack for staying culturally relevant in a genre not known for artistic longevity is singularly remarkable.
That wasn’t a one-off. Over the weekend, the military lampooned Russia’s contention that the troops who gave over Lyman were redeployed. “We thank the ‘Ministry of Defense’ of Russia for successful cooperation,” the Ukrainian armed forces wrote, from the same official Twitter account. And then: “Almost all Russian troops deployed to Lyman were successfully redeployed either into body bags or into Ukrainian captivity.”
Again, Putin isn’t just losing, he’s being mocked. Mercilessly. And seemingly every week there are new accounts (written or, in some cases, recorded for the world to hear) of Russian soldiers lamenting the apparent futility and depravity of the campaign.
At some point, something has to give, and according to Susan Glasser’s latest, it probably won’t be Putin’s penchant for escalation. “Again and again, Putin has profited from the application of military force to achieve otherwise unattainable political gains,” she wrote, adding that,
He came to power by promoting war in the separatist Russian province of Chechnya. He sent Russian troops to Georgia and Syria and, in 2014, to Ukraine. Each time, there were endless rounds of speculation in Western capitals about how to create an “exit ramp” that would finally entice Putin to end his incursion. Putin just kept barrelling down the highway.
So, yes, I’m skeptical when I hear the latest round of “exit ramp” talk. If there’s one thing I’ve learned from watching Putin all of this time, it’s that he is not one to walk away from a fight or back down while losing — escalation is his game, and by now he is very, very practiced at it. As the Moscow Times put it, in a fascinating piece of reporting from inside the Kremlin, “Putin always chooses escalation.”
Glasser spoke to Fiona Hill for the same linked article. According to Hill, the West is “already fighting in the Third World War, whether we acknowledge it or not,” as Glasser put it, summarizing.
For market participants, it’s important to remember that war is almost always inflationary. Currently, it’s “causing fiscal panic,” with the UK and the EU announcing a combined $1.4 trillion of fiscal stimulus, BofA’s Michael Hartnett wrote. “This exacerbates the trend of higher inflation and yields.” He referenced the UK experience from World War II, and briefly mentioned America’s foray into yield-curve control.
Some of Wall Street’s most prominent analysts are now concerned about the scope of the ongoing escalations. Late last week, JPMorgan’s Marko Kolanovic likened apparent sabotage on the Nord Stream lines to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Generally speaking, I continue to believe that investors aren’t apprised of what (or, more aptly, who) they’re dealing with in Eastern Europe. The “off-ramp” some commentators continue to suggest the West should offer Putin is both an admission of the imminent peril that’d accompany a Russian defeat and a wholly perilous option in itself, in that it’d mark the second time in eight years that the West allowed Putin to seize territory.
In “How The War In Ukraine Might End,” Keith Gessen spoke to Hein Goemans, a political science professor at the University of Rochester and a pioneer in war-termination theory. “This will shape the rest of the twenty-first century. If Russia loses, or it doesn’t get what it wants, it will be a different Russia afterward,” Goemans told Gessen. “If Russia wins, it will be a different Europe afterward.”
Goemans doesn’t see scope for a quick resolution. Branislav Slantchev, a student of Goeman’s, recently penned a blog post on what might happen in the event the Ukrainian military’s advance breaks the Donbas front.
“The Russians could try to stem the Ukrainian advance by destroying the dams and using tactical nuclear weapons,” Slantchev wrote. If that were to happen, Slantchev said he “expect[s] them to use something under one kiloton” in an effort to “destroy the ZSU’s offense, and freeze the conflict.”
He continued, suggesting Putin would likely seek Chinese approval before deploying even a small nuclear weapon. “I think that as soon as the nuclear threats begin in earnest, the international calls for an immediate ceasefire will proliferate,” the same post read. As to whether such calls would “be enough to compel Kyiv to negotiate and surrender 20% of Ukraine?” Slantchev’s answer was “No, unless the US abandons Ukraine.”
What happens if the Chinese don’t OK using a nuke? I would like to think Xi has a little more sense.
+1
Though thinking that the fate of the 21st century Eurasia lies with Xi is an unpleasant thought in and of itself.
1) It seems Putin definitely sought Xi’s blessing before the initial invasion. Xi (presumably) told him to wait until after the Olympics were over. That dovetails well with the Russian military hanging out near the border for a month doing nothing, then invading three days after closing ceremonies.
2) I don’t think Putin sees it as “asking permission,” but rather, “getting input.” That said, if Xi says any semblance of, “Use nukes and you’re on your own,” he’ll not use them outside of a no-other-alternative situation (i.e. they’re definitely going to lose the war).
As to whether such calls would “be enough to compel Kyiv to negotiate and surrender 20% of Ukraine?” Slantchev’s answer was “No, unless the US abandons Ukraine.”
Hm. Even then… The Ukrainians got a taste for victory. They now have a certain amount of hardware. Their society is on total war footing. Their morale is sky high.
A tactical nuclear strike, causing relatively little damage to anything (it’s apparently relatively easy to protect yourself from it if you’re not standing on open ground), would infuriate them and have them baying for (Russian) blood.
And I would hope that, should Putin decides to use nukes and its military allows such a strike, the West would have contingency plans to strike back proportionally.
A nuke would get nato involved as the fallout would constitute an attack on nearby nato members. Putin has already been warned of this. His own people might take him out in that case.
It might even happen due to Nordstream sabotage. A blockade of kalingrad could be in the offing.
Xi does have problems at home.
Nordstream was probably a test for other Undersea infrastructure. Basically a piece of Russian property. Many cables Transit Ocean floors.
Geopolitically speaking, so much these days is tragically asinine…..hopeless but not serious…..
If there is a God, let him reach down from Heaven and touch Putin’s heart, and send it into asystole.
I’ve made the argument here before that Putin will go with non-nuclear escalations well before he’d drop a nuke, but I want to expand on that to make another point:
While it doesn’t feel like it to we observers on the outside, Putin has been displaying a trait few ascribe to him: patience. He is fully capable of playing the long game, and he realizes that the longer things drag out, the more the West is likely to lose its appetite for continued support for Ukraine at the cost of trashing their own economies (as someone said, war is always inflationary).
While I could point to the long lag between the 2014 partial invasion and the Feb 24, 2022 total invasion, I would actually point to a different mile post: May 9. A whole lot of experts, including actual Russians who actually know what they’re actually talking about, thought May 9 would be the day Putin would declare a larger mobilization. He didn’t. Why not? It was an auspicious date, he was probably aware he would need the troops sooner rather than later. I think it’s because contrary to those who think he’s racing against a ticking clock, he’s actually happy to draw things out.
So now he’s declared a partial mobilization. The next step is to throw those 300k new troops at Ukraine. Maybe the war of attrition works and Ukraine can’t replace their front line troops fast enough. Maybe Russia wins. Or, maybe it’s a stalemate. That’s fine with Putin. Obviously it’s not his first choice, but he can work with that. He can just call up a few hundred thousand more reservists and keep the grind going.
Escalations would generally be gradual. Why jump straight to nukes when you can just bomb the hell out of Ukrainian positions (by which I mean cities)? There’s still other nasty stuff, like thermobaric bombs, that aren’t quite the level of obviously alienating the world.
Where you’re more likely to see actual nukes is scenarios where Russia is losing badly, and unable to stem the tide through conventional means. This would be something like Ukrainian advances into annexed areas of Crimea, or the Donetsk & Luhansk Peoples’ Republics (i.e. the land he’s occupied since 2014). Ukranian infantry on the ground inside Russia’s actual internationally recognized borders would have a similar effect.
That said, I would point out Ukraine has had the chance to make land incursions into Russia, and they have not. That seems like decision making from the top to not unnecessarily poke the bear. They’ve seemingly landed a few airborne strikes at strategic points, but even those have been few and far between.
So yes, it is in the nature of Putin to escalate, but it also in his nature to move patiently and incrementally. One way or another, we’ll all find out eventually.
Putin will never surrender Crimea, as Sevastopol is one of only two warm water ports the Russian navy has to operate from. Recall, a large part of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is submarine based. This was always the case, and is the reason why Putin seized Crimea, then built an “occupied corridor” to connect it to Russia, and is now seeking an expanded “buffer-zone” of annexed Ukrainian territory. The thought of a tactical retreat–using tactical nuclear weapons–is absolutely frightening, as it risks all manner of escalation.
Zelenskyy has recently called for fast-tract admission into NATO, which would then bind all NATO nations to defend “every inch” of Ukrainian territory from Russian invasion. But which border would NATO be agreeing to defend: Ukraine’s original border (pre-2014), the Russian Crimea/”occupied corridor” border (post-2019), or some newly contrived border? I can hardly imagine Zelenskyy ceding any territory to Russia merely to obtain NATO membership–not after Ukraine’s recent hard fought victories. Nor can I see NATO members (and Turkey in particular) agreeing to evict the Russians from the territory they now occupy, including perhaps Crimea.
As far as sanctions go, Russia sabotaging the Nord Stream pipeline would seem to indicate that it accepts being a pariah state at least for now. Zelenskyy has said he will not negotiate with Russia while Putin is in power, but it seems like wishful thinking to imagine Putin simply being removed from power anytime soon. Some additional Ukrainian victories–short of provoking a nuclear response–would certainly help. Otherwise, I just don’t see how this resolves neatly anytime soon. Here is hoping I am wrong about that.
If I recall correctly Harry Truman once replied when asked if nuclear weapons would ever be used again, something to the effect that “if the world gets into a turmoil, they will be used”.
H-Man, he is cornered and he will fight. Don’t be surprised if those Ukrainian nuclear reactors blow up under a false flag story that it was friendly fire from Ukraine.
The time has come for NATO to provide air support or big gun range of 250 miles. Either one is a game changer. Putin is running out of bodies to carry the flag. Mobilization now means how fast can you get out of Russia.
Read the Times article on the intercepted communications from Russian soldiers calling home.
I think if there is anyone in Moscow with half a brain, they need to kill this guy and disavow the whole bullshit empire thing. Navalny should should say he wants Russia to be rich. Amazing natural resources, very few people. Be like Germany, an economic superpower…
The biggest problem in Russia is corruption. This is also one of the biggest problems in the vast majority of all countries.
The Russian GDP is about $1.5T (in USD), which equates to just over $10,000 per capita (Total population is about 144M). However, Russia has the worst wealth inequality problem in the world (except for a few small island countries). The average wealth is in excess of $10,000 but the median wealth is less than $900 (all amts are usd) due to the oligarchs taking so much of the wealth.
The Russian people are not willing to go fight for economic gain in Ukraine because they know that they won’t see any of that gain. Putin can continue being Putin- but now he is forcing citizens to lose family members for no financial gain. It is one thing to take all of the wealth- but another to take family members.
I hope that the Russian people do whatever they need to do to put Navalny in charge and that Navalny will end corruption- but history indicates this is not a sure thing. The breakdown of USSR was supposed to reduce corruption/enrich the Russian people- but in fact, wealth inequality got worse.
Frankly if you lose a war, there should be regime change. I think if Putin gets a symbolic victory, but thier economy and their demography continue to deteriorate, Russia is screwed. And I think our policy towards China is to tell them, we know you gave the OK to Putin, so he is your errant child, and you are responsible.
Big picture: the old Russian empire included eastern Europe to the west, and central Asia to the east and south. Both these regions have enormous potential, and hate Russia. These could be strong engines of economic growth, replicating east Asia in the last 40 years. First, emulate Singapore, then evolve into more modern societies. I think China will have indigestion around this as well as Russia.
Putin is a bit of a dope. He’s dangerous, yes. He’s certainly over the hill also. Before kicking off the war, he reminisced about the good old days of the Soviet Union. He is not Adolph Hitler. Russia is not Germany in the 1930s, and not as powerful, relatively speaking.
The facts being demonstrated in real-time are that the Russian Army, with Putin at the helm (not the generals), is ineffective. Ukraine takes back swaths of its own territory every day, killing Russians and taking equipment after the Russian Army literally runs away. The Russians have missiles, artillery, and a weakened air force. The army is no longer effective. And they also have nuclear weapons, which they’ll probably use at some point. The danger of nuclear weapon use is real. Putin has no other cards to play.
Xi Jinping has a useless ally in Putin and Russia. It’s almost laughable. The longer the Russian forces are in Ukraine and the longer the war goes on, the more decimated will be the Russian economy and its war-making capacity.
But the danger of nuclear use becomes more real every day. I hope that the US ambassador in Moscow has begun informal discussions with Russian politicians about the consequences of nuclear use and the future of Russia. It would not be good for any country, but would be especially bad for Russia.