John Kelly: I Told Trump He Would Be Impeached Without Someone Like Me

John Kelly warned Donald Trump not to install an obsequious moron as chief of staff when the revered four-star Marine general stepped down late last year.

Instead of taking Kelly’s advice, Trump inserted Mick Mulvaney.

Now, just as Kelly claims he predicted, the president is on the verge of being impeached.

“I said, whatever you do – and we were still in the process of trying to find someone to take my place – I said whatever you do, don’t hire a ‘yes man,’ someone who won’t tell you the truth – don’t do that”, Kelly told the Washington Examiner, in an interview at the Sea Island Summit, a political conference hosted by the paper.

Mulvaney is at the center of the House impeachment probe for his role in bridging the gap between Rudy Giuliani’s shadow pressure campaign in Ukraine and official US policy as orchestrated by EU Ambassador Gordon Sondland, former special envoy Kurt Volker and outgoing Energy secretary Rick Perry.

The prospect of Mulvaney trying to quarterback an international conspiracy is laugh-out-loud funny, and sure enough, the hapless Mick last week stumbled into an admission that the administration in fact held back congressionally-approved aid to Ukraine in an effort to compel the Volodymyr Zelensky government to open an investigation into Democrats. Hours later, he denied saying what he said. It was too late.

Obviously, Kelly would have never found himself in that position, although he did wind up at the center of a truly absurd dispute with a grieving widow who Trump inadvertently insulted. Kelly’s subsequent efforts to cover Trump’s tracks were painful to observe, as they involved, at one juncture, begrudgingly supporting Trump’s contention that Barack Obama didn’t make enough calls to the families of fallen soldiers, including Kelly’s own.

“I have an awful lot of second thoughts about leaving”, Kelly said at the Examiner event. “It pains me to see what’s going on because I believe if I was still there or someone like me was there, he would not be kind of, all over the place”.

Don’t be so sure about that, John. Trump might not be “all over the place” with regard to Ukraine, but he’d surely be bouncing off the walls over something else. We’ll never know how bad 2018 could have been had Kelly not been around, but we do know that John was wholly unsuccessful in keeping the president from embarrassing himself (and the country) on too many occasions to count.

In March of 2018, at an event celebrating the 15th anniversary of the Department of Homeland Security, Kelly called his promotion to White House chief of staff “punishment”. “I did something wrong and God punished me, I guess”, he said.

“Someone has got to be a guide that tells [the president] that you either have the authority or you don’t”, Kelly went on to tell the Examiner, elaborating on his parting advice to Trump. “Don’t hire someone that will just nod and say, ‘That’s a great idea Mr. President.’ Because you will be impeached”.

That was 11 months ago.

It’s at least possible that Trump will be impeached on the one-year anniversary of Kelly’s departure.


 

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2 thoughts on “John Kelly: I Told Trump He Would Be Impeached Without Someone Like Me

  1. Trump’s response: “John Kelly never said that, he never said anything like that. If he would have said that I would have thrown him out of the office. He just wants to come back into the action like everybody else does.”

  2. This is actually pretty cool and fun stuff and as usual sorry for the length, but Wow — if only john kelly could have seen this!

    This is a case just filed 10/25/19:

    Charles Martin Kupperman is the United States Deputy National Security Advisor for President Donald Trump, a position he has held since January 2019. He also was the acting United States National Security Advisor for eight days in September 2019 between John Bolton and Robert C. O’Brien.

    Key Witness in Impeachment Inquiry Asks Federal Court to Rule

    CHARLES M. KUPPERMAN
    9075 Sorreno Ct.
    Naples, FL 34119
    Plaintiff
    versus

    UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al …

    Re: ” … unlawfully impair the President in the exercise of his core national security responsibilities, see generally U.S. CONST., art. II, §§
    2—3, by revealing confidential communications from “those
    who advise and assist [him] in the performance of [his] manifold duties; the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion.”
    United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
    705 (1974). And it would constitute a violation, albeit in good faith, of the oath Plaintiff took to uphold the Constitution of the United States” … blah, blah …

    https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/1.19cv3224.pdf

    ==> Why is this funny? He (KUPPERMAN) quotes a case that was decided against Nixon, who was claiming absolute privilege and attempting to hide from a subpoena. Thus it is funny that the trump morons are out of the reality loop — and if anything, this case below is the roadmap to use for trump obstruction of justice!

    UNITED STATES v. NIXON
    418 U.S. 683 (1974)
    Decided July 24, 1974.

    Oral Argument in U.S. v Nixon

    Re: In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President’s counsel urges two grounds, one of which is common to all governments and one of which is peculiar to our system of separation of powers. The first ground is the valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion.

    However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The President’s need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.

    The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Art. III….

    To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of “a workable government” and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.

    Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch. The right and indeed the duty to resolve that question does not free the Judiciary from according high respect to the representations made on behalf of the President.

    The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. We agree with Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s observation, therefore, that “[i]n no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual.”

    But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that “the twofold aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.” We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense….

    In this case the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third party requiring the production of materials for use in a criminal prosecution; he does so on the claim that he has a privilege against disclosure of confidential communications. He does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are military or diplomatic secrets. As to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities….

    No case of the Court, however, has extended this high degree of deference to a President’s generalized interest in confidentiality. Nowhere in the Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is constitutionally based.

    The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” and “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.

    In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the President’s responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. The interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled to great respect. However, we cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution.

    On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A President’s acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President’s broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.

    We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial….

    We have no doubt that the District Judge will at all times accord to Presidential records that high degree of deference suggested in United States v. Burr, and will discharge his responsibility to see to it that until released to the Special Prosecutor no in camera material is revealed to anyone. This burden applies with even greater force to excised material; once the decision is made to excise, the material is restored to its privileged status and should be returned under seal to its lawful custodian.

    Since this matter came before the Court during the pendency of a criminal prosecution, and on representations that time is of the essence, the mandate shall issue forthwith.

    http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/usvnixon.html.

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