I’d like to buy long-end US Treasurys right now. And I did, both this week and last. But not (nearly) as aggressively as the “contrarian” in me wanted to.

I’m not a “contrarian” in the sense of the term as it’s typically bandied about. In fact, I’m remarkably (oddly, some might argue, in the context of my affinity for hazardous side ventures) “consensus” when it comes to managing my investments.

By “contrarian,” I just mean the discipline I exhibit when it comes to “buying humiliation,” to borrow a phrase from BofA’s Michael Hartnett. “Buying humiliation” just means taking the plunge on assets that’ve suffered an Icarus moment.

I take that plunge as a matter of course, but for a lot of investors, it’s psychologically difficult to put money into something that’s recently cratered in price. The same way it’s (dangerously) easy to throw money at something that’s experiencing rapid price appreciation.

Suffice to say “buying low and selling high” is a strategy that’s easier celebrated rhetorically than implemented consistently.

But not for me. I’ve never had to “hold my nose and buy.” I’d say that’s a product of the risk desensitization that goes along with having put my freedom and life on the line in pursuit of financial gain, but it’s actually not that. In fact, it’s in some sense the opposite.

Notwithstanding my reconnaissance mission into crypto and DeFi, I’m never in the market for speculative financial assets. I get my fill of thrill outside the casino. There’s nothing in any of my brokerage accounts, let alone in my IRA, that I’d be embarrassed to show someone. No aberrant CUSIP, no deviant ticker.

When you “buy humiliation” and you limit your opportunity set to blue-chips and unlevered ETFs, you’re not actually “taking a plunge.” There’s no need to “hold your nose and close your eyes.” On the contrary, when that’s your strategy you’re basically playing with loaded dice. All investments are gambles, but you can stack the deck.

I’d argue Nike’s a good example of asymmetric upside (yes, I bought some), and I’d like to believe the same’s true of the US long-end. I’d very much like to back up the truck at these levels on, for example, VGLT. And as Hartnett alluded to in his latest, ZROZ is the poster child for “humiliation” right now.

There’s the chart. (If you’re unfamiliar, think of ZROZ as a de facto leveraged duration bet relative to something like TLT. The “juice” comes from STRIPS, not borrowed money or derivatives.)

So what’s the problem? Well, where to begin? In the near-term, I’m a bit unnerved by the long-end’s inability to hold any sort of rally. That to me suggests ongoing, “structural” selling pressure.

I’ve seen enough of that by now (and similar price action in other G7 bonds) to believe some version of the yen carry unwind narrative, although I’d note the heavy corporate slate was surely a factor last month too.

The figure below’s simple. It just shows the weekly change in 10-year yields.

This week’s increase, 11bps, was the fifth in a row and the seventh in eight. I reckon that counts as “inexorable,” and while you’d be inclined to believe current yields count as a generous concession, previews of next week’s supply events betray a demonstrably cautious tone.

“Much has been said about the fiscal outlook in the US and the implications for Treasury issuance going forward, contribut[ing] to our worry that the 10- and 30-year auctions could struggle,” BMO’s Ian Lyngen and Vail Hartman wrote. “Furthermore, given that the September payrolls report has undermined the odds of an October Fed hike, there will surely emerge questions regarding the [FOMC’s] level of conviction on fighting inflation.”

Those latter questions are even more pressing in the context of Donald Trump’s remarks to TIME. In keeping with his penchant for saying the quiet part out loud, Trump floated two ideas for “solving” America’s debt problem. One was the standard “We’ll grow our way out of it” liene, but the other found Trump explicitly saying America can inflate the debt away. “You know, certain levels of inflation will also pay off [the] debt very rapidly,” he said. “Very rapidly.”

True or not (it’s true, although I wouldn’t use the term “pay off”), that’s the sort of thing that makes me hesitate about catching the falling knife at the long-end of the Treasury curve. Indeed, even the friendlier, “Grow our way out of it” strategy doesn’t exactly scream “Buy bonds.”

The figure, from the BMO note cited above, shows you the long run history of 10-year yields with nominal GDP growth. The implication’s clear: The current rate of expansion suggests more upside for bond yields.

“The post-COVID economy has experienced structurally higher nominal GDP growth than much of the 2010s owing to the combination of resilient growth and persistently elevated inflation,” Lyngen said, editorializing around his chart and noting that the 10-year moving average for nominal GDP’s tracking at 6.1%, the quickest pace for that metric in more than three decades.

Of course, whenever something’s “humiliated” to the extent the US long-end is currently, there’s usually a long list of reasons to explain why no one wants what everyone’s selling. In that regard, the bear case for long-end US Treasurys is no different from the bear case for Nike in 2026 or Meta in October of 2022 or equities in general in late 2008 or me in 2016.

I bought a fair amount of Meta at the October 2022 lows. That turned out pretty well. As recounted in “Where Were You When The World Didn’t End?,” I put my entire closet safe on the line in equity index funds after Lehman. It took a while, but that worked too. And I bet heavily on myself in December of 2016, when the only other person willing to venture a cautious bull case was Tracy Alloway (and I think that was just moral support; if I were a stock, I doubt she would’ve actually bought any). Fast forward a decade and… well, tell ’em, Curtis.

So I guess it’s VGLT and ZROZ next week. A lot of both. I’ve taken bigger risks in my life. Hell, in the past two weeks.

Disclaimer: For entertainment purposes only. (Are you not entertained?) Not investment advice. Don’t try this at home. Any of it.