Some people — not me, of course — might call Scott Bessent a pompous moron.
If I were inclined to such ridicule — and lord knows I’m not — I’d apologize. Because I wouldn’t want to say something like that about Scott. As Trump associates go, he’s not even in the top 50 ranked by nefariousness.
In fact, Bessent’s not nefarious at all. If he’s “guilty,” it’s by association. That fact that it’s a witting, deliberate association testifies not to wickedness, but rather to a lack of good judgment and hopeless vanity: The allure of being Treasury secretary outweighed for Bessent the long list of pitfalls that go along with hitching your wagon to the Trump train.
What do you get when you pair a lack of good judgment with hopeless vanity? A pompous moron. And an editor more insensitive than myself might not hesitate to say so. Such an editor would probably suggest that characterization’s borne out on a near weekly basis, including this week, when Bessent the Treasury secretary delivered a series of remarks that would’ve made Bessent the trader cringe and chuckle. You’ve surely read the quote by now, but just in case, here it is:
Whenever people say ‘Oh, well, the Treasury secretary’s taking a risk,’ well, it’s my dream. I have asymmetric information. I am the house now. Right? So, when we intervene with the Japanese yen, I have pretty good insight into what the Japanese — what the Bank of Japan’s gonna do, what Japanese policymakers are going to do and, um, you can bet against me if you want.
Bessent was speaking at an event hosted by Southern Methodist University, in Texas.
There’s a lot to love (or hate, depending on whether you find humor in abject, tragic farce) about Bessent’s remarks.
First, Bessent’s confirming, in unequivocal, unapologetic language, that he entered into a quid pro quo with Tokyo over the summer, the result of which was the ceding of authority over near-term Japanese monetary policy to the US Treasury.
Bessent wouldn’t (or hell, who knows, maybe he would) put it in those terms, but that’s the inescapable reality of this situation. I described it at some length in “Emperor Bessent,” last week.
There’s nothing illegal about trading a currency intervention assist for majority voting rights in local monetary policy but… well, “I would like you to do us a favor, though, because our country has been through a lot,” as Bessent’s boss once put it, during a “perfect phone call.”
Second, Bessent more than anyone should know not to tempt traders, let alone dare them. As I’ve been at great pains to emphasize over the last 45 or so days, he can’t (cannot) conjure reserves. Only the Fed can do that. Bessent’s pretending to have unlimited firepower for yen interventions (and bond buybacks), but he doesn’t. That’s not lost on traders.
Scott seems wedded to the idea that he can intimidate the market — that the mere threat of additional FX intervention and, in Treasurys, upsized bond buybacks, will be enough to dissuade traders from pushing the envelope. If he’s right, the fact that his firepower’s finite will be a moot point. If he’s wrong — if traders call his bluff, either in USDJPY or at the long-end of the Treasury curve — he could get himself in trouble.
As one market commentator put it last month, in the course of expressing reservations about Bessent’s bond buyback gambit, Scott’s basically inverting Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy doctrine. Trump’s Treasury secretary speaks loudly and carries a small stick.


No you did not call him a pompous moron. Deft writing, most impressive.
Fking editors
As an editor, I would be grateful for Scotty providing so much easy fodder for my articles.
Have you even said thank you?
“Once” Have I even said “Thank you” once?
Treasury’s “Liquidity Support” buy back schedule for the rest of 2026
extension://pjmlamaidnkoemaaofddboidllnogmhe/https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/221/Tentative-Buyback-Schedule.pdf
Whether these amounts are large enough to suppress long yields more than briefly, I don’t know.
I am just waiting for the moment when Trump starts yelling at Bessent to do more buybacks and makes fun of his golf game.
” Bessent more than anyone should know not to tempt traders, let alone dare them.”
I’m curious about which traders we are looking at. In the past macro hedge funds and prop desks wielded a lot of firepower. Is that still the case?
Or in the case of Japan, are carry traders the dominant force selling the yen? It’s tricky. If they have termed out their borrowing of yen, they may not be so easy to dislodge. Unless they fear more pain to come. In contrast to those who are funding day-to-day. Clouding things up, other carry traders may be tempted to take advantage of the yen move to take or add to positions. Is that worth the risk?
(I’ve been away from that market too long to knowledgeably comment on this.)