“The newly-minted supreme leader has followed along, rarely if ever objecting to the generals.”
Such is the situation in Iran, where Mojtaba Khamenei sends and receives hand-written messages in sealed envelopes through a network of couriers who switch vehicles, traversing “highways and back roads in cars and on motorcycles” to reach the badly-injured figurehead, who’s “awaiting a prosthetic leg” and only “slowly” regaining use of one hand.
Although “mentally sharp and engaged,” Mojtaba can’t speak, or not well anyway, his face and lips having been “burned severely” in the Israeli airstrike that killed his father and several members of his family on the first day of the war. He’s had several surgeries, will ultimately require more, and is convalescing in a bunker.
That’s all according to The New York Times, whose Farnaz Fassihi recently spoke to nearly two-dozen people in Iran, including multiple senior officials and IRGC personnel with knowledge of Khamenei’s status and first-hand insight into the decision-making process inside the regime.
In the piece, Fassihi emphasizes that the younger Khamenei’s acquiescence to the wishes of his generals isn’t solely a function of his condition, nor wholly attributable to the simple fact that he’s not his father, although that’s part of it.
Rather, Mojtaba “grew up with” the generals now calling the shots, owes his ascension to their backing and, as Fassihi noted, is on “a first-name basis” with the military leaders who he “view[s] as peers, not subordinate[s].”
This is all perfectly consistent with what close observers of the conflict already knew, but it’s helpful to hear it conveyed by someone who got it straight from the source(s). Fassihi quotes an expert at a British think tank with contacts in Iran who said the generals are for now presenting Mojtaba not with options, but with “fait accompli presentations.”
As discussed here on any number of occasions, the generals in charge include Guards chief Ahmad Vahidi, security boss Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, Rahim Safavi (he goes way, way back) and, of course, Bagher Ghalibaf, who Mojtaba used to meet “once a week for long working lunches at the ayatollah’s compound” and who the Guards personally “tapped” to lead the first round of negotiations with JD Vance in Pakistan.
At no point since the elder Khamenei’s assassination has anyone other than the Guards made an important decision, the Times piece says. They ordered the bombardment of Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf, they devised the strategy to close the Strait of Hormuz and they also approved the ceasefire with Donald Trump.
Trump’s obviously apprised of all this. So when he said, repeatedly, that the US has achieved “a kind of regime change” in Iran, he doubtlessly meant he believed he could work with the Guards on a deal that would trade control over the country for concessions on the nuclear program.
Note that the Guards, through the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, have a monopoly on industrial and development projects. So, when it comes time to rebuild, guess who gets all the contracts?
And, as I’ve variously insisted, the generals would also be in a position to control the skim on an unsanctioned energy sector (both the Iranian and US proposals for ending the war include massive sanctions relief).
This is why veterans of the Biden and Obama administrations generally (and sometimes gently) argue that Trump shouldn’t rush into a deal with the Guards, even if a grand bargain includes commitments around uranium enrichment.
When sanctions are lifted, Iran will be suddenly awash in hard currency, and with the Guards in charge of the oil, the government and the rebuilding of critical infrastructure, the IRGC will be flush with dollars.
For now, this is a moot point. It doesn’t seem Vahidi and co. are inclined to the sort of nuclear concessions Trump wants in exchange for lifting the blockade which prompted the Guards to resume their own obstructive activities in the Strait.
On Wednesday, the Wall Street Journal said Trump told his cabinet “to prepare for an extended blockade,” a gambit he hopes will “compel a nuclear capitulation” sooner or later. The other two options — a resumption of full-on war or simply calling it a day and going home — are more risky, Trump reckons.
The Journal juxtaposed that piece with another describing an economic “death spiral” in Iran, where “businesses are closing, unemployment is soaring and food is increasingly unaffordable.”
The conspiracy theorist in me can’t help but look at LIV golf’s ’uncertain future’ as a message to Trump (they hold tournaments at Trump National and Bedminster).
I’m no expert on the economics of golf, but I just assumed the LIV tour was on its last legs because it was losing money hand over fist.
That would assume it was meant to be make money in the first place.
Yeah, I guess not. Also now there are way more convenient methods of funneling money to Dear Leader’s family (World Liberty Financial et al.) so maybe LIV is not needed anymore. Or maybe it will be kept alive because Trump likes golf and the idea of having “his own” tournament.
I don’t understand why everyone seems to believe that the uranium is underground, buried by last year’s attack. There are satellite photos of a lot of vehicular traffic at the nuclear sites in the days leading up to the, at the time, well anticipated attacks. At the time I assumed that the Iranians were transporting the enriched uranium to other sites. So why is everyone so sure that it is buried?
Trump’s obsession with the nuclear “dust” is worrying just because it’s another of his left field terms that only he seems comfortable with despite his obvious training wheels on the issue at hand. He’s jumped the shark in averring that there is only dust left due to previous “obliteration,” almost to the point that if the Iranians tried to surrender “ready-to-go” weaponized cores he’d view that more skeptically than several casks full of meaningless dust, since the former would prove obliteration did not occur and, if it had, why surrendering some contaminated dust should make us all feel suddenly reassured that the issue is now durably addressed.
I’m also curious anytime the Iranian civilians’ resolve is questioned for failing to rise up and challenge the present circumstances. There is at least some evidence out there that the civilan “protests” earlier this year that got thousands killed were at least some product of Israel’s shenanigans, rather something more organic and lasting. Meanwhile, the US is revisiting moral depths that I think most of us thought were vanquished and all we got to show for resistance is some strongly worded letters from the opposition party and an occasional No Kings rally populated mostly by white senior citizens. But there is seemingly no shortage of Americans who think the country in which they live is not only currently under attack, but already gone as they knew it and expected it to be. And yet, maybe we’ll get on that after the NBA playoffs are over. I mean July 4th is just sitting there …
Agreed on both counts.
I imagine part of Trumps fascination with the dust is his concrete thinking and his vanity around tearing up the JCPOA and its reliance on inspectors rather than something tangible…at least how it would look.
Speaking of American self-image, it’s hard to square with the observation that it is often an unreliable and exploitive geopolitical treaty partner. Seems the best defense for a country (repressive or not) is to have a viable nuclear threat.
What other options do the remaining Iranian “leaders” have, other than to divide up the oil revenues and quickly and quietly acquiesce?
The list, starting with Soleimani in 2020, of dead Iranian leaders who thought that they could make sustainable progress in their quest to achieve death to Israel and USA is quite long.
I still can’t believe that the Iranian people aren’t rising up against “The Regime” – which has never been weaker in the past 45 years. If not now, then never? Otherwise, is there even a scenario under which the lives of the Iranian people can improve? Maybe that isn’t possible- did the lives of the average person in Libya improve, post Ghaddafi?
One of the other options is to wait for oil to hit $150. When you think about it, its not a bad option from their standpoint.
They would probably get murdered.
The US has tried all out war and societal destruction in the past and are at least 0 for 3 on that. Other regimes have tried it as well and failed. You’d think that the species who think they are the smartest would have figured that out at least a couple of thousand years ago. Maybe AI brain implants will save us. Oops, they’re programmed on our thoughts. Bring on the aliens (but not the lizard ones).
Any time the strong side believes they’ll win by waiting the weaker side out, the stronger side’s patience runs out waaaaay before the weaker side’s resolve. It’s a loser of a strategy, for loser ‘leaders.’
I think a relevant measure is how bad is the current economy in Iran compared to the worst points in the last 50 years (Covid, peak sanctions, Iran-Iraq war, etc), which the regime survived. When the economy gets much worse than that, maybe the blockade will break the IRGC’s will and ability to control and resist. Or maybe not. But I don’t see why economic conditions equal to what the regime survived in the past are very likely to have a different effect now.
Turning to the US side, the Trump administration must have carefully and thoughtfully assessed the domestic economic effects of an extended blockade strategy, and judged them tolerable – right? Or maybe not, since it didn’t carefully and thoughtfully assess its strategy to start the war in the first place.
At least it has probably tried to, which means it has prepared mitigation strategies, and as investors we should guess what those are. They are likely to be market or sector-moving.
Also, how “extended” does Trump have patience for? What I’m reading is that Iran probably has 10-20 days of on-shore storage left, plus 4-6 weeks of empty tankers already in the Gulf, plus empty tankers are still getting into the Gulf, plus some export capacity via Caspian Sea and overland, plus domestic consumption (90MM pop), plus Iran’s prior experience at shutting-in then restarting production . . .
Meanwhile, Trump seems to think in three days Iran’s pipes go “boom” from shut-in pressure. He’s either being greviously misinformed or has selective hearing.
In two weeks when no boom, how does he react? Four weeks no boom? Two months no boom? As US oil storage gets sucked down by Asia, US pump prices rise, and cost rises for three carrier groups and whatever ground forces sitting and sitting in the Gulf. And Iran’s negotiators slow walk or no-show while more mines are laid and the “nuclear dust” gets moved or fortified to the point that a Special Forces extraction operation becomes (even more) infeasible.
Trump is not patient, he always pivots to the next simplistically magical idea, whether that is renewed fighting or history’s most pathetic “mission accomplished” I don’t know. Maybe he needs to keep a lid on his disaster until after his Xi meeting, whenever that is.
When was the last 3 am “crazy” tweet? We haven’t had one of those in a while. Maybe after the media shifts from the assassination attempt/ballroom project topic to something a little more uncomfortable for Trump’s view of the world (as a reflection of himself). As H pointed out, a series of negative articles about how Trump is not being aggressive enough could elicit an emotional response.
Americans in general tend to evaluate everything in money terms, not so in some other cultures. Iran is much more complex than that. It cost us 50,000 souls and so much more in Vietnam. We never learn. Beyond the sword and sanctions we are woefully short of ideas. Vietnamese villagers were not enthusiastic about liberators who destroyed their villages and burnt their crops. Iranians aren’t running to liberators who have threatened to eliminate their civilization from the face of the earth. Show me a country anywhere who thinks America will save them. We’re blind but the rest if the world isn’t.
I’m not sure an “economic death spiral” hurts the IRGC. I don’t think they really care and see the suffering of the average Iranian as necessary sacrifice for the greatness of Allah and the Persian Empire. Sacrifice is for the common people, not the “chosen” ones. If anything the “death spiral” creates an economic vacuum that the IRGC more and more control access to with the capital flows to re-start the country when the time comes. Yes, the re-build as noted in the article, but also the entire economy. It’s a quasi Standard Oil strategy to increase their capture of share/control of the entire country’s economy.
Also, optics matter for the Persian rulers, in both a shallow ego fulfillment sense, but also in a cultural importance and tangible global standing/influence sense.
The more the IRGC can embarrass Trump, the greater their legacy will be and the greater their standing will be in the anti-US sphere (which due to Trump is gaining adherents and influence even in parts of the west).