“My favorite thing is to take the oil.”
That’s a direct quote from Donald Trump who, during a semi-coherent interview with the Financial Times, said that despite the self-evident appeal of commandeering another nation’s fossil fuel reserves at gunpoint, a handful of “stupid people” in America remain dubious of the highway robbery approach employed in Venezuela.
Taken together, Trump’s public remarks over the last 48 hours and additional media reports pointing to US ground operations of some kind in Iran, paint an impossibly convoluted picture.
Simply put: With Iran’s conventional military capabilities decimated and everyone worth killing now dead, Trump doesn’t know what to do next. My advice is take the win and go home. And yes, it is “that simple.” More or less. And if he doesn’t do that, things’ll get really complicated in a hurry.
Iran has a strongman-in-waiting who can double as commander of the armed forces, they still have a foreign minister, they have a civilian government, they have a civil service and they’ll unblock the Strait and stop lobbing missiles as soon as they’re no longer being bombed.
The Iranian people didn’t overthrow the Guards and they aren’t going to. We need to get over that fantasy. There’s no organized resistance, there aren’t enough guns available to civilians and the decentralized nature of the IRGC’s operations makes the logistics impossible.
And militarily, you can’t “defeat” the Guards on an overly-strict definition of the word unless you commit, say, 250,000 troops all at once, storm the beaches, march on Tehran and overrun the government. I assume that’s off the table.
In 2006, Henry Kissinger famously said Iran’s leaders have to “decide whether they are representing a cause or a nation.” Hardliners in Tehran never answered that question. Because they didn’t believe the choice was binary.
But now, over half a dozen years since Qassem Soleimani met his end on the tarmac at Baghdad airport, almost all physical manifestations of the “cause” are destroyed. You can’t kill an idea, but you can bury every person who espouses it. At this point, the US and Israel have pretty well done that.
Additionally — and this is something I reiterate at regular intervals — the idea the US is trying to kill here isn’t the same as the idea America spent decades trying to eradicate during the “War on Terror.”
It’s important (crucial) to differentiate between Iran’s Shia network-building project — Soleimani’s cause — and the kind of generic Salafi jihadism Westerners typically think of when we discuss “Islamic terrorism” (which isn’t a monolith). Generally speaking, the IRGC and the Quds fought against the sort of people America targeted during the “War on Terror.”
This is very complex, and Americans will be forgiven for asking if it’s a distinction without a difference. (“I lost my leg in Iraq. What difference does it make if it was blown off by one of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s guys or by an IED manufactured by one of Soleimani’s guys?)
But it isn’t. A distinction without a difference, I mean. Because while you can never completely stamp out the sort of radicalization that leads people to fly planes into skyscrapers (or travel to Syria to claim a “share” of wives captured in pursuit of establishing a “caliphate”), you can relegate the Soleimani cause to the dustbin of history, because it’s as much a product of circumstance as it is any specific ideology.
Iran’s inter-sectarian marriage with Hamas was one of issue-specific (i.e., anti-Zionist) convenience. The fact that that relationship is what ultimately doomed Iran speaks to the distinction. (Note the emphasis. That’s critical nuance.)
What’s left to post-“cause” Iran is a nation-in-waiting, and I don’t mean that in an overtly hopeful way. Rather — and setting aside the hardline imperative of keeping up appearances in the Revolution propaganda sphere — I mean that the only alternative left to Iran is a garrison state setup where the military leaves space for economic pragmatism centered around the energy sector.
In a best-case scenario, that pragmatism will manifest as opportunity for foreign direct investment which, in turn, will necessitate the permanent lifting of sanctions (you can’t invest in a country that’s cut off from hard currency).
Local living standards would improve in that scenario, the currency would stabilize and although the Iranian people would still be hopelessly oppressed, the deemphasis of apocalyptic fundamentalism in pursuit of regional hegemony — the unofficial abandonment of the “cause” in favor of kleptocratic stratocracy — would at least open the door to the sort of “normality” typical of everyday life in secular autocracies like Putin’s pre-war Russia.
From what I can surmise, Trump has some idea about all of that, even if he can’t articulate it. Suffice to say he’d rather a Delcy scenario where the US gets preferential access to Iran’s oil and gas, he gets another pet dictator and the US military goes home.
Those are his instincts, but he’s pulled in other directions by i) the Sunni monarchies who want to be rid of an assertive Shia autocracy once and for all, ii) Israel, for which even a failed state in Iran is better than an Iran governed by the remnants of the Revolution and iii) survivors of the neocon Titanic in Washington.
And, so, here we are with The Wall Street Journal suggesting Trump’s still entertaining a Mission Impossible-style special forces operation to locate and “extract” 1,000 pounds of uranium from Iran, and Trump himself musing aloud, to the FT, that “Maybe we take Kharg Island” even if that means “we ha[ve] to be there for a while.”
On Monday, Trump underscored how torn he is. “The United States of America is in serious discussions with A NEW, AND MORE REASONABLE, REGIME to end our Military Operations in Iran,” he said, on social media.
Then Trump did what Trump does: He touted “great progress” before threatening armageddon in the same breath. A deal will “probably” be reached, Trump said, but if it isn’t, America “will conclude our lovely ‘stay’ in Iran by blowing up and completely obliterating all of their Electric Generating Plants, Oil Wells and Kharg Island (and possibly all desalinization plants!)”
Meanwhile, in Cairo, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi implored Trump to go home. “I speak to you on behalf of myself [and] humanity,” el-Sisi said, in remarks at an energy conference. “Please, Mr. President, help us stop this war. And you are capable of doing so.”
During his chat with the FT, Trump expressed something like bemused regret at Iran’s apparent immunity to the “art of the deal.” Negotiations are going “extremely well,” he said, “but you never know with Iran — we negotiate with them, and then we always have to blow them up.”
Thanks for the insight.
Damned good argument for what the likely outcome is going to be.
I’ve read similar analysis … with the same likely outcomes earlier today.
Like so many things Trump does …. it really comes down to the last person who has his ear …
he clearly has no real strategy himself.
I suspect he will act in his own self-interest and do whatever it takes to appease the Markets and get oil flowing ….. which probably means doing nothing except stop the attacks on Iran and declaring victory.
I would like to know why this is obvious. I don’t claim to understand a lot here, but the fact that the other gulf states seem to be pressuring Trump to keep going seems to me to indicate that they believe if the war stops now, they are left in a bad position. That bad position seems to be an Iran that understands that they can close the strait at will. An Iran that understands that would use that for leverage from now on, no? Iran has been including claims of sovereignity on the strait and recognition of them in their maximalist demands. Which to me sounds like a message of “we know that you know that we can close the strait”.
Iran is supposed to have manufactured around 55k shahed drones in 2025. They seem to have used around 10k up to now. Guessing their remaining capabilities depend on whatever your estimates are for how many the US and Israel have destroyed.
Again, any and all of this could be wrong. My issue is, outcome here seems far from obvious no matter what action Trump takes, up to and including packing and leaving.
“I would like to know why this is obvious.”
Because they weren’t blocking it before.
On your point about the Sunni powers fearing unfinished business, there’s certainly an element of that, but it’s impossible to separate it from opportunism. In other words, how much is “We’re afraid that if you leave, they’ll keep doing XYZ” and how much is “This is the best chance we’re ever going to get to see that regime replaced with something more agreeable to us?” Complicating any effort to delineate is the fact that the concern and the opportunism aren’t mutually exclusive. Indeed the monarchies may not even perceive a distinction. But there is a difference, and if Trump doesn’t recognize it preemptively, it’ll be quantifiable later in dead Marines.
Let me put it like this. What’s the better bet? That Iran will open the Strait as part of a negotiated settlement or that the US military can “fix” this permanently by partially invading Iran?
The conditions have changed quite a bit from before. One, Iran needs to ask the question “if they stop bombing us now what guarantee do we have that they won’t come back to bomb us again”. Which very likely will happen btw, the US is likely to end in a “mowing the grass” posture like Israel. Two, you learn what you can do with an idea when you implement it in practice. Iran had (obviously) planned how to implement a strait closure. But had not done it before. Now they did it, and it worked. Before it was a wargaming scenario. Now is a reality that can be tuned (like anything in a war, eg, look at how drones got developed from the beginning of the Ukraine war to now)
A negotiated settlement has to be palatable to both sides. Is far from obvious to me that they can meet in some middle. You describe an scenario where the current incarnation of the regime can move forward giving up its enriched uranium and giving up its offense capabilities for a chance to play regular economic prosperity through oil. Sounds to me like that looks like a defeat to the current regime in Iran, while they believe that they have the upper hand strategically given the strait closure. Same for Trump, what terms do not sound like defeat to him.
Besides, those two are not the only options. Push for a failed state, like Israel may prefer, is not obviously off the table (I think that’s terrible btw, for the world and for the Iranian people, so I hope it doesn’t come to that, but among the options for Trump, that is one, escalate to destruction of civilian infrastructure to try to push the regime to break).
I don’t know if that is a realistic scenario tho; the US doesn’t seem to be able to protect the gulf states infrastructure; the resulting damage overall would likely throw oil to the roof. What again is not obvious to me is, among all the horrible options that Trump has now, which one is actually the lesser evil in context for him.
Also consider what percentage of global oil was Iran exports before and what percentage is now that the strait is effectively closed to everybody else. That money is still flowing, and I suspect Iran is not going to use it only to rebuild university campuses.
Also consider other interests. Russia is now very interested in this war continuing.
Well, we’ll see what happens. We’ll know one way or the other which way it’s going within a few weeks and I’ll be right here narrating it.
Great article. I can’t help but follow the money, hard to imagine but I think he sticks around a while longer to appease the monarchies.
The other gulf states will push the US to obliterate/destroy IRGC, etc. as much as is reasonable – and then, ask for more.They might have already gotten more than they ever reasonably hoped for.
However, if other countries (especially USA) are currently willing to send their soldiers, weapons and their billions (USD) to take things down in Iran, even further, why not adopt that rhetoric to push the USA even further! It doesn’t hurt to ask, right?
I hope you are right. I observe a different situation. Yes less amazing than yours. He has dumped on everyone involved except for helping Russia. Time to call it a win?
Editor’s Note: The president would like the strait referred to as the Trump Strait.
The Gulf monarchies have Jarod Kushner’s ear. BiBi has Trump’s ear. Neither want to see a resilient Iran. I fear that they will force our hand.
Taking the purported W and going home will not revert the situation to pre-excursion. It will be worse.
First, Iran will continue to “toll” the SoH. It won’t be blocked per se, but will become Iran’s version of the Suez Canal. At the rumored $2MM/transit, that would be some $60BN/yr revenue to Iran. Control of the SoH will make Iran the most powerful state in the Gulf.
Second, Iran will now finish developing nuclear weapons. It will have plenty of money to rebuild its nuclear and missile delivery capability. China and/or Korea will help. Oh, and resume funding its proxies.
Third, the flow of Gulf state money to Trump Inc will be threatened.
Admittedly, Trump wants to run away, not escalate. But I wonder if he could consider leaving now a W, or sell it as such?
John, a lot (but not all) of what you said here is pure speculation. Some of it’s wild speculation. Your comments on the Mideast, while obviously welcome (particularly in the context of your status as one of the most valuable commenters in the 10-year history of this site, which makes you indispensable even when I don’t agree with you), tend to be off base.
“Some of it’s wild speculation”
Based on rational thought which is, in turn, based on history. But with three unhinged players at work, what was once wild speculation may not be all that wild now, no?
Fair point, Dr. H.
I do tend to look at this Iran thing mostly from a military context (what can the parties achieve on the battlefield) and go from there. I struggle to predict Trump’s emotions and actions in situations like this, when all his choices seem objectively pretty bad. As for Iran, I admit I’ve no sense how Trump’s “new regime” thinks; I am assuming they want to come out of this much stronger than they went in and that their pain tolerance is very high.
“I am assuming they want to come out of this much stronger”
I don’t think that’s necessarily true. And I don’t think it’s possible. Let’s not forget: They never even wanted to fight. Not really. They were drug into this by Hamas. Hezbollah was too.
Khamenei and Nasrallah preached about grand struggles and final battles, but they didn’t actually want one. My guess is that when the grizzly details of Yahya Sinwar’s “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” got back to Tehran and Beirut, those details were met with a lot of hand-wringing, not because Khamenei and Nasrallah felt bad for what happened, but rather because they knew that Sinwar had just given Israel an excuse to take the gloves off, and that once the IDF was done in Gaza, they might come for the whole enchilada.
Point being, this isn’t what Iran wanted. Exactly nothing Iran’s done since October 2023 suggests they wanted this to keep escalating. Everything they’ve done was reactive. Never proactive.
The whole strategy, looking back decades, was to build a network that served a dual function: Power projection / influence and deterrence. Power projection isn’t the same thing as offense. “Invade Israel” was never part of anybody’s plan except Sinwar’s.
And I no more believe that Tehran wants a nuke so they can “glass” Tel Aviv than I believe Pyongyang keeps nukes because Kim wants to blow up Seoul. It’s all about regime preservation and deterrence.
Now we’ve got this rabid badger bleeding and cornered, and our options are a Ray Stantz “Get her!” approach (Google that if you don’t get the reference, it’s funny) or back slowly away and let it slink off. If we jump on that thing, it’s going to scratch and bite and we’ll have to hold it down with our bare hands and choke it to death. I don’t think we should attempt that.
Iran’s nuclear program was surely defensive, as they all are.
It seems like an interesting conundrum. On the one hand, having the program is a primary reason (or at least justification) for attacks (military and economic) on Iran. On the other hand, having actual nuclear weapons would seem a deterrent to (military) attacks at an existensial scale. Arguably, hanging out at 60% means the costs but not the reward. Kind of like pregnancy. Unless Iran thinks Israel will pre-emptively strike (nuclear) to prevent the birth?
Anyway, I don’t disagree that the wisest, least-bad option for the US now is to back out, claiming a tactical W even if strategically it is a L. Which it will be. All the planes and ships and launchers and buildings are just tactical losses that can be replaced.
But Iran can make this backout process easier or harder for the US, right? After all, the fact that the US hasn’t already backed out means that something (someone) is holding it in the situation, and in a month the wisest option for the US will probably still be to back out.
What is holding the US in, is there something net positive Iran can do/get if the US stay is prolonged, how do the people in charge in Iran see it?
Anyway, that’s how my mind works. I understand Ghalibaf or whoever is in charge next might think very differently.
This is Iran War II. Trump will claim victory. Iran War III will happen after the SoH will become useless to the Gulf nations when they complete building their pipelines out of the region, defeat the Houthis, and make peace with Israel while building up their arsenals with oil money if Iran hasn’t become a nation by then.
I have thought for a while now, that Russia and its oligarchs that stepped up after 1989 and ended up billionaires, is what we might be glad to see here. That would be an improvement, because we won’t see democracy here in our lifetimes.
H, your avatar seems appropriate. We are the “Window Voyeurs” looking in on an emotionally isolated Trump who will, to some degree, be influenced by news.
Persia is still a country, like it or not. We’re no going to be able to just take it. (So is Venezuela, BTW) They are who they are and will keep what they have. Large scale invasion will be too expensive. If we try to just declare a win and leave that would cause Israel great pain as they will be left alone and again fall short of their end goals. Someone Trump trusts has told him that just leaving Iran will get him nothing except Mideast bees. Get Israel angry and they might think of launching the Mossad on DC. The other thing that occurs to me is that taking our eye off the ball is like offering the Chinese a freebie not even they can resist.
More generally, the comments here around the war have been outstanding. I can tell most people are putting a lot of thought into what they say, which is a wonderful thing in an era when the quality of online discourse is deteriorating.
What I don’t see in this discussion is a “Hatfield-McCoy” situation where revenge and pride are more important than reason and logic. What if Iran refuses to quit? As a different example, the Viet Minh and Viet Cong never quit, even though the conflict lasted 30 years (1946-75).
Lazy One – I was pondering the same thought. My fellow geezers here may fondly recall how the Wiz Kid Whitehouse advisors were able to hoodwink LBJ into thinking that victory was within reach. If we just escalated one time more or forced a regime change in Saigon.
The most frightening parallel was the frustration when the hopeful outcome remained out of reach. Cue up General Cutis E Lemay’s call on us to “nuke ’em back to the stone age.”
Fast forward to today’s threats from.Bibi and DJT to achieve the same outcome through attacks on Iran’s power and water infrastructure. Mmm, what does that remind me of? Oh yeah, Vadamir has been trying that approach in Ukraine. Perhaps he can offer some advice to his two pals?
What if the whole point in Iran is the Sound and the Fury? What happens if we declare a W? What then? Cuba, amirite? And then? Greenland? Panama? How about Libya – they have oil, right? And maybe they are sending drugs to the US. Or developing a nuclear weapon. Or have very bad, no good, horrible people in charge.
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/30/us/politics/iran-leaders-trump-war.html