If you’re worried about oil supplies in the long shadow of America’s latest effort to effectuate regime change in the Mideast, don’t be. The White House thought this through.

In addition to being an energy superpower in its own right, the US last month discovered 300 billion barrels in the Orinoco River basin. [Waits for laughs. “Is this thing on?”]

One conspiracy theory around the Trump administration’s “make colonialism great again” pilot program in Venezuela — where Washington’s partnering with the Maduro regime sans Maduro on an expensive project to resurrect the country’s oil industry — says the whole thing was a precursor to war with Iran.

It’s a somewhat sloppy theory. For one thing, and notwithstanding that some American refineries are well suited to it, Venezuelan oil’s not the best. Moreover, the cost of modernizing the infrastructure’s enormous, which is to say it’s not a short-term project. If the world’s most important oil chokepoint is temporarily closed due to war, lost barrels can’t be “replaced” by Venezuelan output.

That said, there’s obviously something to the idea that Trump’s main goal in Venezuela was commandeering the crude, not promoting democracy. You can tell because the regime’s still there and also because he said as much himself. And although it makes no sense to say Venezuelan barrels can “replace” product caught up in the Iran conflict, it’s better to control Venezuela’s oil than not if you’re going to bomb Iran.

That’s all worth considering amid predictable handwringing over Tehran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz amid the US-Israeli operation to topple Ali Khamenei’s government.

On Saturday, reports suggested tankers were already avoiding the strait. The credibility of the IRGC’s threat is only as good as the regime’s capacity to carry it out, and frankly, I don’t know if the IRGC’s navy, such as it is, has the logistical wherewithal to set up and enforce a real closure.

It’s not as if Washington and Riyadh didn’t plan for this. They knew full well that as soon as the US and Israeli militaries started bombing, Iran would threaten to cut off the shipping lane through which some 20% or the world’s oil transits.

Iran’s adept at maritime mischief, but here they need a full-on, sustained blockade, which can only happen over the dead bodies of every US naval servicemember in the region. In other words, Iran can cause a lot of trouble with sabotage and shenanigans, but the IRGC can’t sustain a formal closure of that chokepoint.

Iran’s naval assets are middling on capable days. They’re going to do what with those middling assets, exactly? Win a large-scale sea battle with the US navy? That’s a joke, and even to get to a place where we can tell it (the joke), we have to assume ongoing US airstrikes won’t make this a moot point by rendering the IRGC’s assets inoperable.

None of that’s to suggest oil won’t spike on Sunday depending on how things develop, but I dare say the supply risk doesn’t emanate from the closing of the strait, but rather from the (very real) prospect of a post-regime Iran descending into chaos, thereby taking some of the country’s output offline, briefly or not. Or, relatedly, from the US blowing up (accidentally or on purpose) Iran’s energy infrastructure, including and especially Kharg.

But how much would any of that matter beyond a week or two? Iran’s oil remains under heavy sanctions. It doesn’t flow to Western consumer nations, it goes east to China. And you can bet your last rial that every, single drop of available crude was loaded and shipped to Beijing earlier this month, ahead of what everyone knew was a likely US attack.

There’s a cartel meeting on Sunday. I doubt the Iranian delegate’s going to be in a good mood, if he’s even alive. (I’m kidding. He’ll be alive.)

The OPEC+ gathering won’t answer any of the questions that matter. They can tip a larger production hike, but even forgetting that the Saudis are probably the only member with real spare capacity, a hike’s meaningless if you can’t safely get the stuff out of there.

And then there’s the “small” matter that Russia’s the “+” in OPEC+. Moscow’s crude is contraband just like Iran’s, and although the quota-setting process is supposed to be apolitical, the fall of the Khamenei regime is yet another stick in the eye for the Kremlin, and Riyadh’s indirectly complicit.

So… what? Well, that’s just it: Nobody knows. Hold onto your hat, I guess. Or onto your amameh.

And leave it to Trump, by the way, to risk something like this just months before the mid-terms. Imagine a president whose number one political liability is affordability, and who campaigned partly on a promise to end foreign conflicts, specifically those in the Mideast, launching a war with Iran during a mid-term year.

You gotta hand it to him. What, I don’t know. But something. Hand him something.