One narrative, popular among contrarians of various sorts, says the Russian economy performed far better in the face of Western sanctions than anyone could’ve imagined in early 2022 when, after months of explicit Kremlin denials, Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine just like Western intelligence agencies warned he might.

That narrative’s not false. In fact, it’s more or less true.

Initially, the credit went to Elvira Nabiullina, whose deft maneuvering during the war’s earliest months would be celebrated as a Herculean feat of policy adeptness if she weren’t playing for the “wrong” team. Long story short, Nabiullina’s efforts prevented a currency crisis and bought Putin enough time for the economy to adjust.

By the time the Kremlin held a sham election in March, a meaningful share of Russians could plausibly suggest their economic circumstances had actually improved since 2022, with an asterisk to account for uncomfortably high inflation.

Quite a bit of credit for Russia’s post-2022 resilience goes to Beijing. If you’re Russian, remember: Xi’s not a man who forgets a favor. The price of relative stability for Putin was, arguably, the relegation of Russia to vassal state status vis-à-vis Xi’s China.

Whatever happens (and I say this as non-prejudicially as possible under the circumstances), it’s unrealistic to expect a good long-term outcome when you cut yourself off from hard currency and also from the largest market for your biggest export, which is what Putin did in 2022.

With that in mind, Gazprom on Thursday reported its first annual loss since 1999, which is to say its first annual loss of the Putin era.

Part of that’s lower prices. Part of it’s the loss of the European market.

As many readers are surely aware, there are any number of alternative web portals which traffic in thinly-veiled (to the extent it’s veiled at all) Kremlin talking points. Some of those portals masquerade as finance websites or otherwise dress up the propaganda as macro “analysis.”

Such portals can conjure all the bulls–t (if readers will forgive the uncouth expression) they want, but the inescapable bottom line is that Putin bet the house, and everything in it, on a quixotic war which, even in a total victory scenario, will result in exactly no tangible economic gains, or at least not on net (i.e., when netted against the impact of sanctions and lost markets).

Sales of gas at Gazprom plunged 40% last year amid the slowest pipeline shipments to Europe in half a century. Putin (i.e., the Kremlin) is Gazprom’s biggest shareholder.

Let me reiterate, for anyone inclined to assert I’m exhibiting editorial “bias”: The point isn’t to suggest anything about the validity of the war, nor to cast aspersions at Putin’s economy. The point, rather, is that this — the war — was, is and will forever be remembered as, pointless.

Putin’s costing everyone, himself included, all manner of trouble, money and misery for no discernible reason, let alone discernible gain.