I’m a bit reluctant to editorialize heavily around what one mainstream financial media outlet described earlier this week as an “epic” two-day selloff in Treasurys.
To me anyway, “epic” felt like a stretch, if only because we’ve all become desensitized to big swings in bond yields in the 2020s. In addition, it was difficult to disentangle macro factors and Fedspeak from supply overhang — if markets needed an excuse to bring forward a concession for this week’s auctions, the jobs report provided it. The ISM services headline beat and big jump on the underlying prices gauge might be similarly contextualized, and all of that’s to say nothing corporate issuance.
Still, I’d be remiss not to at least highlight the chart. It’s eye candy, if nothing else.
So, that’s 30bps in two sessions on 10s. And technically, it was the biggest (most “epic”) selloff since June 13, 2022.
Some readers might recognize the date even without my chart annotations. That day (a Monday), Wall Street Journal “Fed whisperer” Nick Timiraos tipped the Fed’s inclination to escalate rate hikes to 75bps. During the previous session (Friday, June 10, 2022) policymakers were confronted by a very concerning CPI report. The sense of urgency increased meaningfully just an hour and a half later, when a hot read on the University of Michigan’s longer-term inflation expectations series suggested the FOMC had an emergency on its hands.
Anyway, that’s some context for the back up in US yields triggered by, in succession, NFP, Jerome Powell’s 60 Minutes interview, ISM services and a Neel Kashkari blog post suggesting the neutral rate may be higher. If you missed blogger Neel, here’s the key passage:
[The] constellation of data suggests to me that the current stance of monetary policy, which includes the current level and expected paths of the federal funds rate and balance sheet, may not be as tight as we would have assumed given the low neutral rate environment that existed before the pandemic. It is possible, at least during the post-pandemic recovery period, that the policy stance that represents neutral has increased.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but I previewed the likely renewal of the r-star debate weeks ago. In “Are Fed Cuts Star-Crossed?,” I wrote that, “if the Fed isn’t willing to state, forcefully and formally, that the Committee is confident r-star isn’t materially higher, then forceful, formal declarations about restrictive policy are, at best, hopelessly imprecise and at worst, completely disingenuous — by definition.” That’s effectively what Kashkari said Monday, just in different words.
Importantly, he also mentioned that the Fed’s pretensions to having slowed the interest-rate sensitive sectors of the economy might be overstated. “While home sales are down relative to the pre-pandemic period, overall residential investment was flat in real terms in 2023 [and] construction employment has not fallen during our tightening cycle and instead continues to climb to all-time highs,” he wrote, adding that “while home price growth has slowed, prices have not fallen and are quite high by historical measures, contributing to record household wealth. Even the stock prices of homebuilders are near all-time highs.”
Good points, all. Below find the construction employment series, along with a (hopefully) familiar snapshot of manufacturing outlays and investment.
“When one looks at construction employment outside the housing and residential spaces, you simply have to [mention] the enormous and ongoing stimulus from the Biden administration,” Nomura’s Charlie McElligott remarked on Tuesday, citing various legislation which together pushed manufacturing-related construction spending to “triple its own series all-time high.”
Kashkari’s message was clear enough, but just in case, he spelled it out. “The implication is that… the FOMC [has] time to assess upcoming economic data before starting to lower the federal funds rate, with less risk that too-tight policy is going to derail the economic recovery,” he wrote.
None of this is “new,” of course. It’s not necessarily “news” (with an “s”) either. But taken together, it explains the two-day rout in Treasurys, both at the front- and long-end.
The NFP release (with the accompanying warm read on wages and upward revisions to 2023’s job additions) and the ISM services beat served to reinforce, i) the higher neutral rate argument, and also ii) the “probably not March” message from Jerome Powell’s press conference which might’ve otherwise been lost to regional banking drama. Between that and the above-mentioned concession-building ahead of this week’s auction slate, Treasurys repriced meaningfully.
Commenting further on Tuesday, Nomura’s McElligott said The White House “is certainly looking to do its part and go ‘all gas, no brakes’ on reflating the economy into election day.”
That could ultimately be counterproductive, though, at least when it comes to convincing the Fed to play along.
“Powell is seemingly stuck and unable to begin cuts, despite six-month core PCE annualizing 1.9%,” McElligott went on, adding that the longer the Fed’s forced to wait, the closer the cuts will be to the election, which creates a challenging optic for an “apolitical” institution.



Seems to me just more “noise” in the cacophony that’s been the markets over the last few years . I’m neither smart, trained nor nimble enough to trade the bond markets but seeing a likely medium-long term downward direction for rates, thought yesterday a good day to add incrementally to our growing collection of long duration Treasury ETFs.
The famous R-Star debate… I think one more rate hike will keep Trump from being elected and stop Iran’s proxies from bombing our bases.
R* – put that in the same category as perfect competion, EMH, and CAPM. Very useful concepts for academics and pundits but hazardous for policymakers making decisions and investors putting money to work in the real world. I would rather look at market statistics than posit about R*. R*, probably, if it exists at all is not a stable variable anyway. The exchange rate of the $, price indicies, leading employment indicators, value of gold and other commodities all are better indicators of monetary policy. They are telling a story right now that monetary policy is somewhat restrictive but not overly so. That story can change quickly.
Rate (in)stability and its effects on investing and corporate finance was the subject of my Masters Thesis in 1967. Specifically, I used public utility finance as an example. As far as I can see nothing’s changed materially. One can’t really find hard numbers to make lower risk investments with any confidence when the inputs are flying around like passengers with no seat belts in a careening stagecoach. We can get impressions but will always find it hard to do anything important with confidence.
Naive question … ‘back in the day, … when rates were bought / sold’ – not traded in millisecond like equity, futures and options trades – were these high amplitude swings so common (a stdv. look back, maybe)? -an investing paradigm shift, or technology evolution? Snaps right into your model, …maybe.
I know it’s silly to feel sentimental about FED officials. But, I miss Kaplan and Rosengren.