The “view” from where BofA’s Michael Hartnett is sitting goes something like this. “Still bearish risk assets on the price of money and higher-for-longer = hard landing.”
That’s verbatim from the latest installment of his popular weekly “Flow Show” series. In the past, Hartnett has described himself as a “patient bear,” but this week, he used the word “impatiently” in the context of the long wait for “capitulation selling,” a recession or a “credit event” with the potential to “trigger bullish policy easing.”
As noted here on several occasions over the past month or two, the march higher for US yields is likely sowing the seeds for its own reversal at this point. Hartnett echoed a version of that talking point. “Sometimes higher growth causes higher yields, and sometimes higher yields cause lower growth,” he remarked. (Ah, the circle of life. Or something.)
3% US 10s torpedoed small-caps, retail and biotech, 4% undercut banks and REITs and 5% is “now cracking high yield bonds, homebuilders, utilities and oil,” he went on. “Investors [are] now forced to sell leverage and deleveraging = much slower growth.” Eventually, anyway. The one-word question is “When?”
A clean resolution (not to be confused with a clean continuing resolution) would see the data roll over, clearing the way for a traditional late-cycle bull steepener+. But there are any number of more messy scenarios, one of which Hartnett has described in almost existential terms.
“Once recessionary bond and stock markets mutate into economic data, bonds rally big,” he wrote, adding that bonds “should be the best performing asset class of H1 2024.” I’d agree with that. After all, it couldn’t possibly get too much worse for Treasurys.
I don’t know why Hartnett uses 10/31/2022 for the “trough” date on the current bond bear market in the table on the left above. The current long-end drawdown dates from March of 2020 to today, basically, and the scope of that drawdown is near 50%. In any event, it doesn’t so much matter: The point is that this is the worst bond bear ever, and bonds are severely oversold, as shown in the figure on the right.
But the ultimate risk (this is the “existential” messy scenario mentioned above) is that bonds don’t rally in a recession. Regular readers are well acquainted: I’ve touched on this multiple times, including in the aptly titled “What If Bonds Don’t Rally In A Recession?”
The “nagging fear remains political,” Hartnett said. “In 2024 80% of global equity market cap, 60% of global GDP [and] 40% of the world’s population heads to the polls.” That, he went on, is “an incentive for more not less fiscal stimulus.” The “ultimate fear is a loss of political and policy credibility which engenders a ‘bond yields up, US dollar down’ crash trade.”
That’s the debasement trade. That’s what happened in the UK a year ago: Gilt yields up, but pound at record lows amid fiscal panic. If that were to happen to the US, it’d be disconcerting indeed.



The main possible reasons for why bonds may not rally in a recession are, I think:
1) the recession will feature high inflation (stagflation),
2) Treasury supply during the recession will be too high relative to demand,
3) uncertainty and thus term premium will be high.
#1 might happen, if inflation’s sensitivity to rates is much lower than economic growth’s sensitivity to rates. Which is related to the “soft or hard landing” debate, so if the assumption is a recession aka hard landing, I think the risk of #1 has to be at least significant.
#2 is hard to assess, while supply will likely increase in a recession (until, perhaps, the 2025 expiration of the TCJA tax cuts which may increase revenue by $300-400BN), I don’t understand the demand side well. It is easy to say QT, AOCI, FX depress demand, but the Fed, banks, and foreign govts are only some of the buyers. It is also easy to say discretionary investors will “fly to safety” but does that mean fly to duration? And how big are those different buyer groups, and what are their motivations?
#3 means predicting an unobservable future thing – dicey! – but in general, uncertainty of all sort, including term premia, tend to be higher in recessions. I’ll post a link in a sec.
So if #1 is “definite maybe”, #2 is “no idea”, and #3 is “probably yes”, then seems the “bonds don’t rally” scenario is at least a substantial risk?
This is a very interesting paper that is relevant to this topic.
https://finance.unibocconi.eu/sites/default/files/files/media/attachments/SteveHou_JMP20180115111812.pdf